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The question of Islam as a political force is a vital question of our times, and will 
be for several years to come. The precondition for its treatment with a minimum 
of intelligence is probably not to start from a platform of hatred. 
 
Michel Foucault, Dits et Ecrits III, 1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Islamist Paradox in Iran 
1. Introduction 
 
 
The rise of Islamist movements at the end of the 20th century was largely an 
unforeseen development. During the past decades the movement has been 
radically transformed, and it currently manifests itself with a number of different 
expressions. A political view in the West, and especially in the US since 9.11, 
tends to perceive Islamist movements as a global security threat. Moreover, 
Islamist actors are regularly referred to as major players in the coming ‘clash of 
civilizations’ announced by Samuel Huntington. The debate on how to conceive of 
Islamism today is characterized by conflicting views. Some claim that the Islamist 
threat is stronger and more pervasive than ever, while others hold that the Islamist 
trend peaked several years ago. Accordingly, disagreement ensues on the question 
of how the movement’s current manifestations should be understood and dealt 
with. Increased knowledge of the trajectories of Islamism is necessary in order to 
understand, and hopefully respond constructively to the Middle East in the future. 
One way to increase our knowledge is to explore the validity and 
fruitfulness of central theories existing in the field, and their relevance in 
explaining internal dynamics of countries in the Middle East. In this thesis I will 
explore and examine aspects of Olivier Roy’s thesis on ‘the failure of political 
Islam’, and its fruitfulness in explaining developments in the religio-political 
sphere in post-revolutionary Iran.  
The Islamist experience in Iran is special in many respects. Iran was the 
only country in which the Islamist movement managed to take power and establish 
what seems to be a durable ‘Islamic state’1. In 1979 the Islamic Revolution led by 
                                                 
1 The Islamist movement also achieved temporary power with the dictatorship of General Zia ul-Haq in 
Pakistan (1977-88), and with the military coup d’ètat under the aegis of Hassan al-Turabi in Sudan (1989). 
The Taliban in Afghanistan (mid-1990s till 2001) may also be mentioned in this respect. Neighter of these 
managed to institutionalize a durable state with popular support. 
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Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini succeeded, and the Islamic Republic of Iran was 
institutionalized in the following years. This event was completely unanticipated 
by most observers, and it represented a lucid demonstration of the renewed 
political significance of religion in the region. Iran’s Shia Islamic nature along 
with its Islamist political system has characterized the relationship between 
religion and politics in the country ever since the revolution. 
Following the Islamist’s consolidation of power, religion was meant to 
shape politics and influence all aspects of society. However, faced with socio-
political realities, politics repeatedly came to prevail over religion in the Islamic 
Republic. This was evident in the 1979 Constitution, the constitutional reform in 
1989, in general legislation, and political appointments. Even if religion is central, 
and highly visible in the political institutions in Iran, its role is increasingly 
marginalized. Recent developments indicate a move away from Islamism in the 
country that celebrated the success of the political vision of Islam only twenty-five 
years ago. How could this decline of political Islam be understood?  
The French Sociologist Olivier Roy is professor at the School of Advanced 
Studies in Social Sciences in Paris, and the director of research at the Centre 
National de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris. He is a central and prominent 
scholar in the field of Islamism, and his argument is regularly fielded in the 
current debate over the trajectories of Islamism and the Islamist future2. His main 
thesis is presented in his controversial book; The Failure of Political Islam3 
(1994), and it holds that political Islam has failed. He argues that Islamism does 
not pass the test of power, and that the failure of political Islam in Iran was 
unavoidable because of the inherent inconsistencies in the Islamist agenda. The 
                                                 
2 Roy is the author of a number of books on Islam and Islamism. His main publications are: Islam and 
Resistance in Afghanistan (1986),  The Failure of Political Islam (1994), Afghanistan: From Holy War to 
Civil War (1995), The New Central Asia (2000), Généalogie de l’islamisme (2001), Les Illusions du 11 
septembre (2002), Globalized Islam: the search for a new ummah (2004), with Mariam Abou Zahab 
Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection (2004), and La laïcité face a l’islam (2005). 
3 This book was originally published in French in 1992 with the title; L’échec de l’Islam politique. It should 
be noted that the French word échec has connotations like ‘defeat’ and ‘setback’ in addition to ‘failure’. In 
the following I will refer to the vocabulary established by Carol Volk in the English translation from 1994. 
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aim is political power and the establishment of a religious state to fight 
secularization, but political action will amount to creation of a secular space and 
the religious state will inevitably be secularized as a result of the unification of 
religion and politics. “Herein lies the limit of the politization of religion, of any 
religion” (Roy 1994:23). Further, Roy argues that the intermixing of religious and 
political spheres will lead to a contamination of religion and a delegitimation of 
religious leaders. “The (…) Islamist order is simply removing Islamic values” 
(Roy 2004:89).  
 
Presentation of Research Question 
 
In this study, I will explore the dynamic relationship between religion and politics 
through central theoretical claims made by Olivier Roy in his thesis on ‘the failure 
of political Islam’. The fruitfulness of Roy’s thesis in explaining the unique 
developments in post-revolutionary Iran will be the centre of attention. I will 
mainly seek to answer the following question: 
 
To what extent is Olivier Roy’s thesis on ‘the failure of political Islam’ fruitful in 
explaining religio-political developments in post-revolutionary Iran? 
 
My agenda is consequently to test theoretical arguments of Roy’s thesis by 
considering their relevance in explaining religio-political dynamics in the Islamic 
Republic. Based on the findings, comments will be given on the general 
productivity of Roy’s thesis, the relevance of the case of Iran, and the general 
debate on the trajectories of Islamism in the Middle East. 
The task will be undertaken by a consideration of Roy’s core theoretical 
arguments, focused on the inherent characteristics of the Islamist ideology, and the 
nature of religio-political dynamics. Fundamentally, he claims that inherent in the 
Islamist project are the seeds of its own destruction. Based on the assessment of 
Roy’s thesis I will establish an analytical framework centered on the Islamist 
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paradox. The paradox amounts to the incompatibility of aiming at political power 
and the establishment of an Islamic state, and at the same time aspiring to oppose 
secularization and strengthen the standing of religion in society. The framework 
will subsequently be applied to developments in post-revolutionary Iran. 
I will argue that Iran is not an Islamic state, and account for institutional 
arrangements and political events symptomatic of the relationship between 
religion and politics in the country. The dysfunctionality of the regime will be 
highlighted, and Roy’s argument will be applied to uncover whether the current 
situation was an inevitable results of religio-political dynamics encouraged by the 
Islamist experiment. 
The findings will enable me to discuss the fruitfulness of Roy’s thesis, 
specifically with reference to Iran, and more generally with reference to the debate 
on Islamism. Roy’s thesis is of a comparative nature and it concerns general 
dynamics. I will accordingly argue that the findings on the case of Iran may 
suggest general relevance for Roy’s claims. However, the case of Iran has unique 
features, and I will emphasize the limits of my findings. The theoretical debate on 
Islamism will be invoked to account for central critique directed at Roy’s 
conception of the phenomenon. The divergent views of Roy and Burgat will 
especially be considered, to underline Roy’s agenda and show the productivity of 
his approach.  
The current debate on Islamism is a multifaceted debate of great 
significance to the future of international relations, and I believe that Iran is of 
special interest for two reasons. Firstly, it is categorized by the US as a central 
country in the ‘axis of evil’, and a field of interest in American foreign policy. The 
US went to war in Iraq aiming at regime change and democracy, and they have 
lately showed a growing concern for developments in Iran. Thereby, questions 
related to Iran are of global interest as well. Knowledge of the trajectories of 
Islamism and the country’s internal religio-political dynamics is important to 
avoid jumping to unconstructive ‘solutions’ for the country. Secondly, Iran is of 
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interest for the general prospect of democratization in the Middle East. The 
political situation in the country has generated a religio-political public discourse, 
unparalleled in most Muslim countries throughout the region. Khomeini’s 
redefinition of the religious tradition, and the contradictory legacy he left, opened 
the door to a public debate on the proper role of religion in society – a public 
discourse more familiar to a Western than an Islamic tradition. Recent years have 
shown a significant move towards democracy in the country of the popular 
religious revolution. Reformist and democratic voices have evolved from within 
the country’s religious establishment and cultural tradition. If Iran ever finds a true 
democratic arrangement that is compatible with Islam, this could prove important 
for other Muslim countries as well.  
The Islamist heritage is a crucial element of today’s democracy debate in 
Iran and the Middle East, and it continues to shape and influence developments in 
the region. 
 
Presentation of Outline 
 
Above I have presented my field of interest, my research question and its 
relevance. In the following I will account for concepts that will be central to the 
following presentation, and specify how I will apply them. 
In the second part I will account for methodological considerations relevant 
to the study of historical events, the empirical material that will be used in the 
analysis, and the relevance of conceptual frameworks in this field. 
The central features of Roy’s thesis will mainly be outlined in part three. I 
will describe and discuss aspects of his theoretical argument, with focus on the 
inconsistencies in the Islamist project, and religio-political dynamics. I will 
account for critique from Francois Burgat directed at Roy’s thesis, and discuss the 
divergent views of these central contributors in the field. Bjørn Olav Utvik will 
also be briefly mentioned in this respect. Strengths and weaknesses of Roy’s 
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theoretical and conceptual frameworks will be considered – generally, and 
specifically when applied to Iran and Shia Islam. Finally, I will present the 
analytical framework centered on the Islamist paradox. 
In the fourth part I will briefly account for relevant background information 
on the religious tradition of Shia Islam and the case of Iran. This will be centered 
on the traditional relationship between religion and politics in Shia Islam, 
Khomeini’s innovative doctrine of velayat-e-faqi, and the Islamic Revolution.  
The Islamist experiment in Iran will be analyzed in part five. The task will 
be undertaken by using empirical sources documenting institutional arrangements 
and historical events in post-revolutionary Iran. The empirical part of the analysis 
will be centered on the nature of the Iranian state, the relationship between religion 
and politics in the Islamic Republic, and the functionality of the regime. The 
empirical considerations and findings will be analyzed and summed up with 
reference to the analytical framework of the Islamist paradox, presented in part 
three. My aim is thus to establish a coherent picture of the dynamic relationship 
between religion and politics in Iran, and the failure of political Islam in the 
country. 
In part six the findings, the method, and the theory used will be evaluated. I 
will discuss whether Roy’s thesis is fruitful for understanding developments in 
Iran, and whether the failure of the Islamist experiment was inevitable. The unique 
features of ‘the case of Iran’ will be elaborated upon to highlight the limits and 
centrality of the findings. In considering how fruitful Roy’s theories are in 
explaining developments in Iran, I will also comment upon the general 
productivity of his approach. The theoretical debate on the trajectories of Islamism 
will again be invoked, to emphasize the relevance of Roy’s conception of the 
phenomenon, and the significance of conceptual frameworks in this field. The 
general importance of the case of Iran will also be highlighted. 
Finally, some concluding remarks will be given on the general findings and 
characteristics of the study. This will be supplemented by comments on the 
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prospects for future democratization in Iran, and the significance of the Islamist 
heritage in the Middle Eastern context. 
 
Concepts 
 
No coherent conceptual framework exists that all implied researchers adhere to 
when writing on religion and politics in general, or Islamism in particular. 
Consciousness on conceptual issues is vital for reaching constructive conclusions. 
I will further elaborate on this in the methods part. Below I will shortly account for 
concepts central to the rest of the presentation. 
 
Political Islam, Islamism and fundamentalism  
Political Islam and Islamism are often used interchangeably in the research field, 
but they may be distinguished on degree of preciseness. Political Islam could be 
understood as “ideas and programmes of socio-political transformation based on 
Islam” (Zubaida 2000:62). Islamism more specifically denotes movements which 
have Islam as the main focus of their political activity, and aim at establishing an 
‘Islamic state’ where sharia; the Islamic law, guides all political action, economic 
development and social arrangements (Vogt 1993:207). Political Islam could thus 
be understood as a wider concept, and can be applied to several phenomena 
mixing Islam and politics. In line with common practice in the field, represented 
by theoreticians like Roy, Kepel and Burgat, I will largely use Islamism and 
political Islam interchangeably. The terms will refer to that political vision of 
Islam originating early in the 20th century, but gaining momentum in the Muslim 
part of the world in the late 60’s and early 70’s. 
 Islamic Fundamentalism is often used synonymously with Islamism and 
political Islam, especially for comparative studies of fundamentalism across 
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different religions. Certain drawbacks are related to this concept, and I will not 
apply it in the following4. 
 
Secularization and modernization 
Secularization is a central concept for grasping the relationship between religion 
and politics in today’s world. Along with the growing relevance of religio-political 
concerns, the nuances of such concepts become significant. Secularization should 
be distinguished from secularism, which denotes the world view and ideology of 
secularists. Roughly it could be said that “[S]ecularists suppose that during 
modern times, and especially during the past several generations, religious 
illusions have gradually disappeared” (Keane 2000:5). Secularization, on the other 
hand, should be understood to describe the relationship between religion and 
politics. It is a concept with several meanings, but it normally refers to a 
weakening of the role of religion in the public sphere. Secularization is taking 
place when religion becomes less significant in legitimating political power and 
legislation in society. Religion simply becomes less central to the functioning of 
the social system. This is not necessarily negatively perceived by theologians, 
because it will often free religion from practical worldly concerns, and thus from 
profanation (Furseth & Repstad 2003:101pp).  
I will use secularization to denote intended or unintended separation of 
religion and politics in the public sphere, with the result that politics gradually 
prevail over religion. Secularization refers to a process whereas secularized refers 
to a state. Secular simply means ‘outside of religion’, and will be used to describe 
elements with separate autonomy independent of religion. In the Iranian context, 
the dynamics related to secularization operate in the relationship between religion 
                                                 
4 ‘Fundamentalism’ originated in a Protestant Christian context, and it is therefore problematic when 
applied to other religions. ‘Political Islam’, ‘Islamic radicalism’ and ‘Islamism’ has largely come to replace 
it in studies of religio-political movements in Islam (Vogt 1993:206p). Still, ‘Islamic Fundamentalism’ is 
used by scholars like Bruce Lawrence in comparative studies of religious movements in opposition to the 
modern age (1995).  
Master Thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies 
 
8 
The Islamist Paradox in Iran 
and politics, but largely amount to the question of the proper relationship between 
religion and state. 
In the following, modernity will refer to political and religious 
arrangements alien to traditional Islam, and modernization will denote the 
processes leading to such arrangements. Modernization does not necessarily imply 
secularization. However, in the Islamist vocabulary they are closely associated, 
and I will accordingly use modernization and secularization interchangeably as 
manifestations of theWestern Enlightenment values that Islamists generally 
oppose.  
 
Shia Islam and Shia Islamism 
Ithna ashariyya, or Twelver Shiism, became state religion in Iran in 1501, and is 
the largest fraction within Shia Islam5. I will use the general term Shia Islam to 
refer to this sectarian variant of Islam dominating the religious picture in Iran. 
Roy builds a general theory, and does not distinguish significantly between 
different forms of the Islamist phenomenon. There have been many different 
expressions of the meeting between Islam and politics, and Islamist movements 
have unfolded in diverse ways, dependent on historical conditions and cultural 
contexts. Thus various trajectories of the different fractions can naturally be 
observed. The tension between general trends and particularities will be a 
challenge that I will seek to balance throughout this paper. Generally, I will use 
Islamism to refer to common traits of the movement, and use Shia Islamism when 
writing on features unique to the Shia branch. Lebanon and Iraq also have 
significant Shia Islamic populations, but Iran is outstanding throughout history as 
the dominating Shia country, and in the following Shia Islamism will mainly refer 
to the movement shaping the developments in Iran. 
                                                 
5 A number of different Shia variants exist, and their differences are mainly related to disagreements on the 
right succession to the Imamate. The ‘Iranian’ type of Shiism has, however, come to dominate most Shia-
Muslim groups in the Middle East. 
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Transliteration 
Concepts related to religious traditions and functions will generally be referred to 
with traditional Arabic transliteration. When it comes to the term velayat-e faqih 
(the rule of the jurist), I have decided to keep the Persian form, due to its close 
association with developments in Iran.  
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2. Method 
 
 
This thesis will be placed within the dual field of religion and politics, and the 
approach will be theoretical, historical, and empirical. By applying Roy’s thesis to 
historical developments in Iran, my aim is to test its central theoretical claims. The 
analysis will be centered on the state level of the Islamic Republic, and mainly 
concerned with aspects relevant for the relationship between religion and politics.  
 
Historical Investigation  
 
Dealing with religion and politics, the intention is to consider the development of 
religious doctrine and movements in their interaction with a variety of social and 
political conditions. Historical method “tries to trace recent developments to roots 
and causes in the past” (Keddie 1983:2). This past could be either distant or recent. 
Scholars like Keddie look for roots and causes of present conditions in Iran all the 
way back to pre-Islamic times. To test Roy’s theoretical claims, I find it rational to 
limit my historical investigation to the most crucial post-revolutionary years, and 
events directly related to the dynamics and relations of religion and politics. 
In this study, the context and period of interest is Iran in the years after the 
revolution in 1979. The empirical material needed for considering Roy’s thesis 
and the case of Iran will be taken from summaries and analysis of historical events 
and institutional arrangements in the country. I will focus on specific incidents 
chosen from this period, specifically events around the death of Khomeini (1989), 
and the election of Khatami as president (1997). The historical and social 
conditions will naturally be simplified to draw attention to the relevant features of 
the developments. 
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Dealing with historical events always presents a number of challenges. 
Reconstruction of the past can never give an accurate and complete picture of the 
events and their contexts. And the task of reconstruction always takes place as 
interplay between the available information about the past, and the researcher’s 
own preexisting knowledge and expectations (Kjeldstadli 1999:209). The research 
question I have raised, along with the theoretical framework I have chosen, 
necessarily influence my perception and judgment – and thereby the examples I 
choose and how I portray them. This bias can never be eliminated, but it can be 
reduced through careful selection of sources and consciousness in the way theories 
are applied. 
 
Sources 
The sources should be reliable, representative and sufficiently detailed for the 
purpose, and they should be established, or approved, by knowledgeable and 
reliable researchers in the field. The most reliable picture is established by sources 
that are independent of each other, and in agreement (Kjeldstadli 1999:210). I will 
generally use examples that appear in several sources on historical developments 
in Iran, and thereby could be understood as central and relatively unambiguous. 
Most writers have their agendas when writing about such events, but I will mostly 
draw upon material not intended to support or discredit Roy’s theories, to avoid 
the most obvious biases. The examples will be chosen to highlight characteristics 
in the relationship between religion and politics in the Islamic Republic of Iran.  
Objectivity can neither be fully attained in the material I use, nor in the 
choices that I make. However, I believe that the key sources to my presentation 
exhibit extensive academic prudence, and as such will make up reliable sources. 
Central to my empirical presentation are the works of; Ali M. Ansari, Daniel 
Brumberg, David Menashri, Susan Siavoshi, and Sami Zubaida, all prominent 
scholars with valuable contributions on religion and politics in Iran. 
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Theoretical framework 
Historical periods are characterized by a number of events with complex 
connections. A critical examination and analysis are necessary to break the subject 
into smaller parts that can be investigated isolated, and later combined to construct 
a reliable picture in which overall patterns in the development can be discerned 
(Kjeldstadli 1999:223). I will interpret the historical developments by applying 
aspects of Olivier Roy’s thesis on the failure of political Islam, as laid out in the 
book The Failure of Political Islam (1994) and further developed in Globalized 
Islam. The Search for a new Umma (2004). The isolated events and the combined 
picture created by them will be seen in light of an analytical framework based on 
Roy’s theoretical arguments. The theoretical framework will be applied as a tool 
to uncover patterns and connections in the material. The approach will mainly be 
inductive – I will use the isolated observations to generate a broad picture of the 
situation (Kjeldstadli 1999:214).  
Roy does not distinguish between hypotheses and theories in building his 
thesis. Following from the nature of his study, I will use interchangeably terms 
like: ‘Roy’s thesis’, ‘Roy’s theories’, and ‘Roy’s arguments’. 
 
Conceptual Frameworks 
 
Studies concerning Islamism, political Islam and fundamentalism tend to apply 
concepts differently, and as a consequence the overall picture often becomes 
blurred. The concepts chosen and employed by each researcher necessarily 
influence and shape findings and conclusions. Thereby divergence in 
understanding could be explained by differences in the conceptual frameworks 
used. The importance of being conscious in making conceptual choices can hardly 
be overestimated. The theoretical debate on how to understand the trajectories of 
Islamism is characterized by conceptual confusion and argumentation with 
different focuses. This debate will be considered in more detail below. 
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The aim of commenting upon the fruitfulness of central concepts in this 
field is built into the overall aim of theory-testing. Generally, the conceptual 
framework created and used by Roy is useful and productive, even if some 
weaknesses should be noted. Roy’s thesis and the concepts he applies, will be 
presented and further examined in the following part. 
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3. Theory 
 
 
The Debate on the Trajectories of Political Islam 
 
Along with Olivier Roy, the French scholars Gilles Kepel and Francois Burgat are 
also central to the theoretical debate on how to understand and respond to political 
Islam. Roughly it could be stated that Roy and Kepel agree on the understanding 
that political Islam as a broad ideological movement has peaked, and lost its place 
as the key motivating force in Middle Eastern politics (Roy 1994, Kepel 2002). 
This view has been repeatedly criticized, and especially after the 9.11 attacks on 
the US, because the attacks left the impression that the ‘Islamist threat’ was more 
potent than ever6. Such criticism is, however, based on a misunderstanding of Roy 
and Kepel’s theses. Their agenda is not to argue that radical elements7 from the 
Islamist movement are irrelevant for today’s world, rather that political Islam as a 
broad movement with wide appeal and influence in Muslim countries belongs to 
the past – a fact that hardly can be denied. 
Both Roy and Kepel relate the ‘failure’ or ‘decline’ to the nature of the 
ideological Islamist movement, but Roy more carefully develops the theoretical 
framework explaining how the dynamics in the relationship between religion and 
politics produce the failure. My impression is also that Roy is more theoretical, 
less focused on conflict, and less populist in his expressions than Kepel. Roy’s 
theoretical focus, and his explicit handling of religio-political dynamics, makes his 
thesis very appropriate for considering the fate of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
                                                 
6 Conservative American writers like Daniel Pipes, have especially been critical of this view. Pipes is the 
editor of the radical ‘Middle East Forum’, and generally believes that American interests should guide 
discussions and approaches to the Middle East. To him, Islamism constitutes a powerful threat to US 
interests.  
7 Both Roy and Kepel consider such radical elements to be the last, desperate expressions of an ideology 
that has failed. Those kinds of reactions are known from other failed ideological movements like Marxism 
and Communism in Europe. 
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In the theoretical debate on the subject, the notion of ‘failure’ of the 
Islamist movement has been severely criticized by Burgat. He argues that political 
Islam in its current form, for instance as political parties, is continuing to play an 
important role in Middle Eastern politics – in some instances even as modernizing 
and democratizing forces. From a theoretical point of view I find that these views 
are not necessarily in opposition. I will return to the divergent views of Roy and 
Burgat shortly. 
 
Olivier Roy’s Thesis 
 
Olivier Roy is one of the most central theoreticians writing on the trajectories of 
Islamism, and he is repeatedly renewing and developing his views. The main 
characteristics of Roy’s thesis on Islamism are laid out in the controversial book 
The Failure of Political Islam, first published in French in 1992 and in English in 
1994. Here he argues that political Islam does not pass the test of power, and that 
the Islamist movements were unable to provide an effective blueprint for an 
Islamic state. He relates this failure to the inherent inconsistencies in the Islamist 
project. In Globalized Islam. The Search for a New Ummah (2004) he further 
develops this thesis, and explores the new realities confronting today’s Muslims 
all over the world. From this book I will use the concept of ‘post-Islamism’ to 
denote societies like present-day Iran, that has been altered as a consequence of 
Islamism in power.  
Roy’s project is to build a comprehensive and general theory on the 
trajectories of political Islam from North Africa to the Indian subcontinent. Based 
on comparative material he seeks to find common characteristics in the different 
fractions of the Islamist movement. The material substantiates developments 
within different cultural and political traditions, including the origin, development 
and culmination of the Islamist movement, with reference to both Sunni and Shia 
Islam.  
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It should be noted that there are slight modifications in the works presented 
by Roy, from 1994 to 2004. In Failure of Political Islam he argues that the 
Islamist movement has failed, that its proponents drift towards 
neofundamentalism, and that its remnants will disappear, except for some extreme, 
radical elements. In Globalized Islam. The Search for a New Ummah, he sticks to 
his notion of failure, but acknowledges that the Islamist experience is still relevant 
in Middle Eastern politics. The parts of Roy’s thesis dealing with the fractions that 
failed to reach power, or the drift towards neo-fundamentalism are not relevant for 
the case of Iran, and they will only briefly be touched upon in relation to the wider 
debate on the trajectories of Islamism. 
Roy’s comprehensive work is widely valued as an important contribution to 
understanding political Islam; however, he has been criticized on his conception of 
the phenomenon, and methodological choices. Relevant critique will be accounted 
for to highlight the validity of Roy’s thesis. In the following I will review the 
aspects of his general thesis that I find most relevant for understanding Shia 
Islamism and the case of Iran. My focus will be on the arguments directly 
concerned with how and why the relationship between religion and politics will be 
altered as a consequence of the Islamist agenda. 
 
Roy’s conceptual framework – and how I will use it 
It should be noted that Roy does not put much effort into defining his conceptual 
framework, or discussing nuances and difficulties related to central concepts. 
Analytical categories relevant to the study of modern Islam, needs to be adjusted 
and specified according to purpose. And as previously suggested, conceptual 
clarification is crucial for reaching constructive conclusions in this field. 
Roy largely uses ‘Islamism’ and ‘political Islam’ as synonymous in 
building his thesis, but he specifies the meaning of ‘Islamism’ by stating that it; “is 
the brand of modern political Islamic fundamentalism that claims to re-create a 
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true Islamic society (…) by establishing first an Islamic state through political 
action” (Roy 2004:58). Islamism thus specifically denotes an ideology explicitly 
aiming at political power and the establishment of an Islamic state. As previously 
suggested, political Islam could be used more generally to denote programs with a 
political agenda for Islam. I will use the terms interchangeably, as practiced by 
Roy, however, communicate their differences in evaluating my findings. I will 
suggest that some distinction may be productive for conceptual clarification. 
Roy invents the concepts of ‘neo-fundamentalism’ and ‘post-Islamism’ to 
describe current trends. Most fractions of the Islamist movement failed to gain 
significant political power, and Roy argues that the movement underwent a drift 
towards neofundamentalism. Neofundamentalists reject the Islamic revolution as a 
means of establishing an Islamic state, and rather encourage re-Islamization from 
below – based on individual return to the practices of Islam. Even if they in theory 
consider that Muslims should live under an Islamic state, they reject the political 
struggle as a means (Roy 1994:75, 2004:247). Central aims of the Islamist 
ideology are thereby left behind. The concept of neofundamentalism is not central 
to the case of Iran, and I will not employ it further. The phenomenon described as 
post-Islamism merits some attention though. The concept denotes societies 
influenced by a failed Islamist experiment, and means that religion is suppressed 
from the public sphere – the “privatization of religion” (Roy 2004:97). I find it to 
be useful as a descriptive category to draw attention to the present situation after 
the ‘failure’ in a country like Iran. But as an analytical category it is rather 
unproductive because it is imprecise and impossible to test. In the following, post-
Islamism will be used to depict a society where the relationship between religion 
and politics has been profoundly altered as a consequence of the Islamist 
experiment.  
In Roy’s vocabulary, “the invention of modernity lies in the emergence of 
an autonomous political space, separate from both the religious and private 
spheres” (Roy 1994:8). I will adhere to this definition in order to signify that 
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modernity and modernization represent arrangements and developments alien to 
the original Islamist ideology. 
Roy notes that Iran is a special case, but he does not distinguish 
significantly between Sunni and Shia Islamism in his theoretical considerations. 
Some difficulties ensue in trying to balance the general traits of the Islamist 
movement and the particular characteristics of Islamism in Iran. The theory is 
general, but the case is unique. I will comment further on this tension in 
considering the fruitfulness of Roy’s thesis. 
 
Islamist political thought 
The Islamist political imagination is dominated by the idealized paradigm of the 
first community of believers at the time of the Prophet. From this paradigm 
follows a number of central themes in Islamist political thought. There should be 
no separation of the religious, legal, and political spheres, and thus no distinction 
between the religious and the political orders. The sole source of law, as well as 
the norm for individual behavior should be the sharia, and the definition of an 
autonomous political space, with its own rules, positive laws, and values, is 
prohibited. The ideal is to have power to rule over the entirety of the ummah; the 
community of the faithful, and therefore the state is never considered in terms of a 
territorialized nation-state (Roy 1994:12p).  
The Islamist movement is a sociopolitical movement, founded on an Islam 
defined as much in terms of a political ideology as in terms of a religion (Roy 
1994:39). The movement’s principal aim when it resurfaced in the 60’s was to 
stop and reverse the process of secularization. Islamists generally believe that the 
society will be Islamized only through social and political action; it is necessary to 
intervene directly in political life and attempt to gain power. Khomeini even held 
that it was a religious obligation to revolt against a corrupt state.  
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Islamists reject secularization and other expressions of Western values, but 
even if the movement explicitly opposes modernization, it incorporates several 
elements of modernity. According to Lawrence, Khomeini and his followers 
enjoyed a measure of success precisely because they came to terms with the 
modern world even while opposing it. They were ‘anti-modernist moderns’, and 
could both be seen as a product of – and a reaction to – the modern age. (Lawrence 
1995:xiv). Lawrence states that; “they accept implicitly the benefits of modernity, 
often thriving through their use of technology, while explicitly rejecting 
modernism as a holistic ideological framework” (Lawrence 1995:17). But even if 
the Islamists draw upon the instrumental benefits of modernity, like 
communication-networks and other technology, they believe that Islam is a 
complete and universal system that does not have to modernize or adapt. They 
demand a religious government and an Islamic society guided by the sharia in all 
aspects (Roy 1994:37pp). “The essential premise of the Islamist movement is that 
the political model it proposes presupposes the virtue of individuals, but that this 
virtue can be acquired only if the society is truly Islamic” (Roy 1994:27). This 
circularity of thought eventually makes the goals unattainable. 
Roy argues that the Islamists’ means have worked against their ends in such 
a way that they have ended up strengthening the processes they originally 
opposed. Religion is occupying a central place in the political discourse in 
countries like Iran, but its factual influence and legitimacy is severely diminished. 
The Iranian people increasingly view the regime as illegitimate and incoherent 
with the values of Islam. According to Roy, these trends could be explained by 
contradictions in the Islamist ideology. 
 
Inconsistencies in the Islamist project 
Roy argues that Islamist thought has failed to fulfill its program because it tried to 
integrate modernity, but met up with the ‘Islamic political imagination’ of the 
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tradition, which essential premise is: politics can be founded only on individual 
virtue (Roy 1994:21). Thus, the Islamist theoretical model has broken down. The 
Islamic society only exists through politics, and the political institutions only 
function as a result of the virtue of those who run them – a virtue that presupposes 
an Islamic society. The circle is complete, and the goal seems unachievable. The 
Islamic revolution in Iran, along with other Islamist movements, failed to provide 
a model for what an Islamic society should be like and how it should be brought 
about (Roy 1994:60). According to Roy: 
There is no concrete political, let alone economic, model inherent in Islamism. Islamism 
in power will systematize the policies of Islamization ‘from the top’ already evident in 
officially secular or moderate regimes. (…) As we have seen, such a model in and of 
itself does not generate institutions capable of functioning on their own: the dream of 
justice and social redistribution can be based only on the virtue of those who implement 
it. But the transformation of Islamist parties into mass movements and the test of power 
will produce the same results that it has with all other ideologies: the ‘pure’ will be 
corrupted or will abandon politics to climbers, careerists, and unscrupulous businessmen. 
Any Islamist victory will be a mirage (Roy 1994:195). 
 
The Islamic society is an illusion that can never be fulfilled, because Islamism 
cannot withstand the exercise of power without undermining the original goal. The 
central aims of countering secularization and strengthening the standing of religion 
in society will inevitably be diluted because political action will lead to the 
creation of a secular political space and the primacy of politics over religion. 
Additionally, the logical outcome of state power is a desacralization and 
devaluation of religion from its connection with worldly, fallible concerns. The 
religion’s authenticity in society will be lost, and its sacred space eliminated. By 
bringing religion into the political arena, Islamism becomes an agent in the 
secularization and delegitimation of religion in Muslim societies.  
Roy’s thesis is centered on the Islamist paradox. If power is reached, the 
Islamist’s actions will systematically undermine their goals. He highlights the 
Iranian revolution to exemplify that the Islamists will use more political tools to 
bring religion under their control the closer they are to power (Roy 2004:83). “The 
pervasive importance of politics has undermined the pristine ideals and values of 
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Islamic ideology. The means may have jeopardized the end” (Roy 2004:88). In 
Iran, the rulers’ obvious corruption and compromise in meeting with socio-
political realities, contributed to a loss of religious authority, because the religious 
leaders were associated with the corrupt political system. The de facto 
secularization currently taking place in Iran is brought about not only by the 
hegemony of politics over religion, but also as a result of both conservative and 
reformist religious forces trying to ‘save’ religion from contamination and 
profanation through political authority (Roy 2004:90p).  
The Islamists’ aspiration to protect religion fails because the true 
functioning of politics and society are not taken into consideration: 
The autonomous functioning of the political and social arenas wins out, but only after the 
religious sphere has been emptied of its value as a place of transcendence, refuge, and 
protest, since it is now identified with the new power (Roy 1994:199). 
 
Finally, the Islamist project is not able to generate viable institutions capable of 
dealing with social and economic problems. A dysfunctional state will ensue. 
When the ideology is based on a flaw – “when virtue doesn’t function, it’s 
opposite emerges: the abuse of power, speculation, and corruption” (Roy 
1994:145) – the system necessarily fails. 
 
Post-Islamism 
At the core of the Islamist myth was the unification of religion and politics. In a 
society characterized by post-Islamism, both spheres are autonomous, despite the 
wishes of relevant actors. Roy claims that: 
A post-Islamist society is one in which the Islamist parenthesis (in the sense of a 
temporary experiment) has profoundly altered relationships between Islam and politics by 
giving the political precedence over the religious in the name of religion itself (Roy 
2004:3). 
 
“Post-Islamism does not imply the emergence of a secular society as such” (Roy 
2004:4). It expresses the crisis of the relationship between religion and politics, 
and is a reaffirmation of the autonomy of the political, and of the precedence of 
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politics over religion. The role and status of religion are decided by the political 
even in an ‘Islamic’ state like Iran. The conditions for secularization are set by the 
endeavor to build an autonomous sphere for religion, by way of a pervasive 
politicization of the religious sphere. Contrary to the claim that a reluctance to 
separate religion and politics strengthens the standing of religion in society, it 
strengthens the prevalence of politics over religion (Roy 2004:3p).  
In the era of post-Islamism, the proponents of political Islam are forced to 
relate to modernity in a different way. Even if elements of modernity were evident 
in the movement from the start, these were explicitly denied and suppressed by the 
Islamists. With the apparent failure of religion to guide and control politics, 
today’s Islamists more openly adhere to the realities of modernization and 
secularization taking place in the society – because they could not fight such 
trends. To Roy, this redefinition of doctrine indicates the failure of the original 
ideology. 
To sum up, the failure of political Islam can be attributed to the inherent 
incompatibilities in the Islamist project. The Islamists aim at political power and 
the establishment of an Islamic society based on non-separation of religion and 
politics. However, mixing of religion and politics tends to deprive religion and 
religious leaders in the society of their sacred positions. And the inevitable 
consequence of political action is the establishment of an autonomous, secular 
political space. Islamists in power will thereby contribute to a delegitimation of 
religion and a secularization of society – the opposite of their goal. Thus, once the 
aim of political power is achieved, the Islamist political vision of Islam will fail. 
The basic premise of individual virtue of every Muslim – a precondition for an 
Islamic society – is dependent on the existence of such a society. This circularity 
of thought ensures that the goal can never be achieved. In a post-Islamist society 
the relationship between religion and politics will be altered as a consequence of 
the Islamist experiment, because it gives precedence to politics in the name of 
religion. Finally, the Islamist project is likely to generate a state and a regime 
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incapable of functioning satisfactorily. These are central theoretical arguments in 
Roy’s thesis on the failure of political Islam. 
 
Critique from Francois Burgat  
 
Francois Burgat is a Political Scientist and Arabist. Writing on Islamism, he 
emphasizes the cultural, national and identity-based aspects of the movement, and 
seeks to highlight the particularity of the different fractions. His agenda is to 
denounce; “its [the movements] supposed antipathy to the dynamics of social 
modernisation and political liberalization” (Burgat 2003:178). Thereby he seeks to 
show that Islamism can contribute to modernization and democratization in the 
Middle East. 
  He is explicit in his support of Roy’s role at the forefront of the thought of 
Islamist movements, but he is generally critical of Roy’s thesis on the failure of 
political Islam. He argues that the processes are not yet completed and that it is too 
early to speak about the Islamist movement in the past tense, simply because it has 
not yet been able to deliver its promises. Burgat accepts Roy’s claim that Islamism 
has lost its ‘original impetus’ and evolved to become mundane and ‘social 
democratic’ – that it no longer offers a different kind of society and a brighter 
future. He also agrees that Islamism will be regenerated as a result of this. It is 
Roy’s conclusion that he will not accept; that the Islamists have already lost, and 
failed even before they reached their goal (Burgat 2003:159pp). Both Roy and 
Burgat acknowledge that the goals originally set by the Islamists are impossible to 
reach through the prescribed ways. But Burgat’s main position is that if today’s 
proponents of political Islam prove to have a political impact in the future, the 
conclusion of the movements failure is too hasty (Burgat 2003:163p). He argues 
that it is evident “that, one day, there will be room for an expression of ‘post-
Islamism’. That day has not yet arrived” (Burgat 2003:183).  
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If proponents of political Islam display political relevance in the future, will 
that be enough to disprove the claim that the original broad Islamist movement 
failed to reach its original goals and fulfill its promises – and that this failure was 
inevitable? Burgat seems to think so. 
 Further, he attacks the concept of ‘post-Islamism’ and its use. According to 
Burgat, adherents of the post-Islamism thesis claim the ‘irrelevance’ of Islamism. 
Accusingly he writes; 
Now that they [the Islamists] keep their activity within the framework of the nation-state, 
and reconcile the vocabulary of Islam with the values of modernity, Islamism no longer 
merit consideration as a religious group. This is what the promoters of the theory of post-
Islamism are telling us, each in their own way (Burgat 2003:180). 
 
I believe that this statement is based on a misunderstanding of Roy’s position. As 
Burgat himself has acknowledged, Roy does not seem to imply that Islamism in its 
current form is irrelevant, rather that it has lost its original impetus, and is now 
appearing in another form. The current elements of the movement have other aims 
and ambitions, and significantly – they relate to modernity and modernization in a 
different way. Burgat himself states that they even ‘reconcile the vocabulary of 
Islam with the values of modernity’. This development contradicts the original 
Islamist ideology, and could easily be seen as a logical response to the failure of 
their original intention to fight modernization and its inherent values. 
 
Islamism and modernization 
Burgat’s critique is thus related to the relationship between Islamism and 
modernization. He argues that; “the ‘new’ findings that are supposed to illustrate 
the transition to ‘post-Islamism’ have even been previously designated as part of 
the very essence of the old Islamism” (Burgat 2003:180p). He rightly observes 
that modernity was present in Islamism from its very beginning, and he uses this 
fact to state that their current involvement with such modernity cannot be used to 
claim the failure of the movement: 
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If the modernity of the Islamist movement was really inherent at its very inception, as 
numerous authors have long shown, the sudden retreat of the ‘Islamist’ label as applied to 
its representatives in the current generation would seem to be no more than the simple 
reconciliation of an academic construction with a social reality that, for many years, 
refused to conform to the vision that social scientists had of it (Burgat 2003:181).  
 
According to Burgat, the crucial elements of analysis are the ‘reformist’ or 
‘modernist’ dynamics of Islamism, which he claims have been underestimated 
because they contradict the dominant perception of the phenomenon (Burgat 
2003:62). He argues that political Islam, even with its anti-Western attitudes, can 
contribute to more democracy and greater tolerance, and that parts of the 
movement still enjoys considerable support. He states that he wants to show that 
the processes of Islamization and modernization are far from being mutually 
exclusive, and that the modernity has long been evident, even if it was not 
recognized by the political actors concerned (Burgat 2003:180). Similar ideas have 
been voiced by Bjørn Olav Utvik (2002) in a book edited by Burgat. Utvik has 
also more specifically noted that some groups in Iran presently aspire to separate 
the religious and political institutions. And he argues that this does not necessarily 
mean that the Islamist ideology is left behind (Utvik 2003:15). Would not a 
fundamentally new way of relating to modernity – even encouraging the 
emergence of an autonomous political space – represent a break with the original 
Islamist ideology? Non-separation of religion and politics was at the core of 
Islamist political thought. A changed attitude towards modernity and 
modernization implies a new world view and strategy.  
Roy, Burgat and Utvik largely use the same evidence, but interpret it in 
different ways. Burgat’s association between Islamism and modernization are 
harmonious with Roy’s claim that Islamization entails secularization. The question 
is consequently how this association between Islamism and modernization should 
be interpreted. Should Islamist contribution to such developments be regarded as 
‘failure’ or ‘success’ on the part of the Islamists?  
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As previously stated, the Islamists were ‘anti-modernist moderns’. They did 
benefit from modernity, but explicitly rejected modernization and secularization in 
their discourse. Today’s proponents of political Islam have largely been forced to 
accept and act according to the rules of modernity, and even if they exert influence 
in the political life of their respective countries, this can not disprove the claim 
that political Islam did fail according to the original intentions. The central 
objectives of political power and the establishment of an Islamic state, only remain 
as distant visions. They have been replaced by an objective to Islamize society 
through morals, culture and behavior (Burgat 2003:54).  
Burgat further argues that: “The Iranian experience seems in many respects 
to be an awkward interruption to the seamless notion of ‘secular’ political 
modernity” (Burgat 2003:171). Thereby he ignores that the present modernizing 
developments in Iran seem to go hand in hand with a profound secularization of 
society. If the Islamists in power in Iran contributed to this secularization, it is 
reasonable to assume that it was unintended because their aim was rather to fight 
such trends. What is relevant is not mere existence of elements of modernity, but 
rather attitudes towards it, and the intentions behind actions related to it. Seen in 
this way, there are real and important differences between the ‘old’ Islamism and 
the present situation of post-Islamism. 
 
Failure versus success 
Roy holds that the Islamist movement changed in its meeting with socio-political 
realities due to its paradoxical objectives. Whether one decides to call this success 
or failure is a matter of conceptualization rather than of substance. In the Islamist 
project is the seeds of secularization. Islamism in power can not reverse, and are 
likely to strengthen the de facto separation of religion and state. In Iran the 
developments have seemed to lead to more democracy. However, the fact that the 
processes they instigate could be seen as positive does not mean that the Islamists 
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have succeeded. Roy holds that achievements must be measured against stated 
aims and promises, and not based on capacity to adapt and willingness to give up 
original goals. Success of today’s Islamist elements can thus be taken to support 
the notion of ‘failure’, if it follows from detachment from original goals, or if the 
changes were unintended. Unintended effects are also effects. 
It could thus be argued that Roy and Burgat are more in disagreement on 
how to depict and interpret the subject, than on the central features of it.  
 
Does Burgat’s critique affect the theoretical argument of Roy’s thesis? 
Roy and Burgat are both concerned with the relationship between religion and 
politics in the Middle East, and more specifically the trajectories of Islamism in 
the region. But there the similarities stop. They are approaching the phenomenon 
in different ways and with different focuses. Roy’s point of departure is the 
ideological mass movement originating in the 60’s, and the failure of the different 
fractions to either reach power or to pass the test of power. Whereas Burgat – 
without acknowledging the failure demonstrated by Roy – is focusing on the 
current position of the remnants of the same movement, and their potential role as 
a modernizing force in society. His critique of Roy’s notion of ‘failure’ is based on 
his observation that political Islam continues to be a central political force 
throughout the Middle East. 
Roy focuses on the inconsistencies of the theoretical Islamist model, and 
the failure of Islamism to be true to its ideology in practice. Their current 
ideological shift and redefinition of doctrine are seen as a consequence of their 
unavoidable ideological failure. However, Roy does not imply that political parties 
propagating political Islam in the Middle East today are irrelevant or unimportant. 
He emphasizes that even if the Islamists have failed: 
This does not mean that the Islamist movements did little to shape the political and 
strategic landscape of the Middle East, or that they are out of the game. They played a 
very important role, albeit not one congruent with their ideology (Roy 2004: 61). 
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Most fractions of the Islamist movement failed to gain significant political 
power, and this necessarily resulted in a modification of the original aims and 
ambitions. Today’s Islamist expressions in the Middle East could be described as 
either radical and violent, or as moderate and adapted. And both these trends could 
be understood as expressions of a failed project; the first as a desperate expression, 
and the second as an adaptive realization of the political realities confronting 
them, and new prospects for exerting influence. Burgat mainly focuses on the 
latter, and the characteristics and trends that he emphasizes, could largely be seen 
as indications of the failure that Roy wants to demonstrate.  
 This leads us back to the significance of conceptual frameworks. The 
debate seems to be blurred because its central participants talk about different 
things, using the same words. My agenda is not to deny the fact that there are 
differences in the views presented by Roy and Burgat, but rather to suggest that 
their differences are not that much related to substance. Their divergent views 
might be explained by different focuses and conceptual frameworks. ‘Islamism’ is 
used by Roy to denote the ideology aiming at establishing an Islamic state through 
political action. And he uses the concepts of ‘neo-fundamentalism’ and ‘post-
Islamism’ to describe the present situation. Burgat, on the other hand, does not 
recognize the culmination of the Islamist project, and conceives of present groups 
and political parties thriving on its legacy as a continuation of the original 
movement. To him, the notion of ‘failure’ is premature because he still awaits the 
impact today’s proponents of political Islam may have in future Middle Eastern 
politics. Both approaches are likely to be productive – albeit for different 
purposes. 
Burgat’s observations are as important as they are interesting, but they are 
not that relevant for Roy’s theoretical argument on how the inherent 
incompatibilities in the Islamist project brought about the failure of political Islam. 
When evaluating my findings, I will further comment upon these different 
conceptions of the phenomenon. 
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The Fruitfulness of Roy’s Thesis 
 
Roy has also been criticized for the general nature of his study, and the 
methodological choices underpinning his thesis. More specifically he has been 
accused of seeking to fit everything into his framework by imposing the material 
onto the theory. This critique is mainly directed at the way he quite selectively 
uses material selected across time and space to support a current phenomenon of 
relatively limited scope. Utvik argues that Roy reaches his conclusions “by 
bringing a strange agglomeration of evidence apparently selected with no other 
principle than supporting the hypothesis” (Utvik 2000:39). I find this critique to be 
rather superficial. Roy’s empirical material is comprehensive and gently handled 
with academic prudence. Through in-depth case studies of phenomena and 
fractions relevant for understanding Islamism on a general basis, he carefully 
develops his theoretical framework. More generally referring to comparative 
studies, Utvik has also stated that “comparison probably always has some value, 
but the desire to find common traits between the objects observed easily gains the 
upper hand” (Utvik 2002:45). This is the nature of comparative research; some 
nuance will necessarily be lost in the search for general trends. In dealing with 
general phenomena with a variety of local expressions, there will always be 
questions on whether to give priority to generalities or particularities. 
The comparative nature of Roy’s study necessarily weakens the level of 
specificity in his overall findings. Still, the core of his theoretical argument, 
focused on the nature of ideological movements and religio-political dynamics, is 
not severely influenced by these methodological choices. Thus, potential 
weaknesses following from lack of specification and attention to particularities, 
will not limit the productivity of applying his general theoretical framework to a 
specific case. It is the essential theoretical argument I find most illuminating, and 
its general nature makes it fruitful for comparative studies, as well as studies of 
individual cases.  
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Roy’s thesis and the case of Iran 
The general picture of Islamism is complex because the trajectories of the different 
fractions of the movement have not been identical, and developments have 
occurred at different paces. The case of Iran is special because the Islamists 
reached power and the Islamic Republic was institutionalized. As the country 
represents an unambiguous example of Islamism in power, it constitutes a good 
case for testing the theoretical claims made by Roy. Other countries have not had 
the same experiences. Iran might be the clearest example of the failure of the 
Islamist experiment, and the experiences from the Islamic Republic are very 
central to Roy’s thesis. Burgat’s focus on current political parties makes him less 
concerned with the case of Iran. This disparity in the appreciation of the case of 
Iran may also contribute to explain their different conclusions. Iran is a unique 
case, but I also believe that it is central for understanding religio-political 
dynamics related to the Islamist project. I therefore find Roy’s focus and approach 
to be fruitful. 
It should be noted however, that Roy makes certain associations that 
deserve critical attention. In his theory-building, the differences and relations 
between Sunni and Shia Islam are not properly specified. This is unproblematic 
when focusing on religio-political dynamics from a theoretical point of view, but 
in testing his theory he continues not to be explicit on the differences; he uses 
evidence from the very special case of Shia Islamism in Iran to support his general 
theory on how Islamism will never pass the test of power. The experiences from 
the Islamic Republic are highly relevant for other cases, but they should also be 
treated with reference to their unique nature. Based on my findings, I will further 
comment on the case of Iran relative to the general theoretical framework 
presented by Roy.  
Roy’s thesis is largely compatible with existing knowledge in the field. It 
addresses an important social phenomenon, and seeks to explain it by consistent, 
specific theoretical arguments. By examining associations between religion and 
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politics in Iran, I wish to explore whether the thesis explains the developments 
satisfactory, and generates new insight about the topic under question. Roy’s 
thesis is general and comparative, but I believe that its core theoretical argument 
can form the basis for a coherent analytical framework to be applied to 
developments in post-revolutionary Iran. 
 
The Islamist Paradox – an Analytical Framework 
 
Above I have, quite selectively, described Roy’s thesis on ‘the failure of political 
Islam’. I have chosen to focus on what I understand to be the core of his 
theoretical argument, centered on the nature of ideological movements and religio-
political dynamics. I have also discussed Burgat and Utvik’s insightful comments 
and critique directed at Roy’s thesis, however, argued that the issues they note do 
not significantly alter the value of using Roy’s framework for analyzing 
developments in Iran. 
 In my analysis I will seek to uncover whether it in fact is reasonable to talk 
of a failure of political Islam in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and if it is, whether 
this failure was instigated by the Islamist experiment in the country. This 
background will enable me to consider the fruitfulness of Roy’s thesis in 
explaining religio-political developments in post-revolutionary Iran. 
The Islamists wanted to establish an Islamic state, and counter 
secularization through political action. Central to their ideology were non-
separation of religion and politics, and the ambition to Islamize all aspects of 
society. According to Roy, the failure is mainly evident through the altered 
relationship between religion and politics, amounting to secularization of society 
and delegitimation of religion. Eventually, the inconsistencies in the Islamist 
project generate a dysfunctional state.  
Fundamentally then, Roy argues that once the Islamists achieved power in 
Iran, their failure was inevitable. In trying to implement the Islamist ideology, 
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certain religio-political dynamics would ensue – systematically undermining their 
goals and the legitimacy of their project. The emerging dysfunctional state will 
contribute to underline the infeasibility of the Islamist agenda. This is the Islamist 
paradox. Inherent are the following factors and processes: 
 
Secularization: 
Political action is necessarily followed by the emergence of an autonomous 
secular, political space. Politics prevail over religion, and a de facto separation of 
religion and politics will be apparent in state institutions, general legislation, and 
the daily functioning of the state. Secularization will unfold, and might even be 
encouraged by religious leaders trying to save religion from profanation. 
 
Delegitimation of religion: 
Mixing of religion and politics will inevitably deprive religion and religious 
leaders of their sacred positions. Unavoidable declericalization of state institutions 
and overt suppression of religious concerns will marginalize and contaminate 
religion. 
 
A dysfunctional state: 
Failure to solve the tensions between religion and politics – between theory and 
practice, are likely to amount to a dysfunctional state. Evidence of such collapse 
will be a regime incapable of dealing with social and economic challenges, 
depending on violence and corruption to stay in power, and increasingly 
disapproved upon by its own population. 
 
These factors are manifestations of the failure of Islamism to fulfill its promises 
and pass the test of power. If the inconsistencies in the Islamist project contribute 
to explain developments in Iran, this will support Roy’s notion of ‘failure of the 
Master Thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies 
 
33
The Islamist Paradox in Iran 
Islamist experiment’ in the country. The failure will also be evident in the altered 
relationship between religion and politics, depicted by Roy as ‘post-Islamism’.  
With reference to historical events and institutional arrangements in post-
revolutionary Iran, the analysis in part five will evolve around the following 
questions: 
-Is Iran an Islamic state?  
-What is the relationship between religion and politics? 
-Does the regime in Iran function satisfactorily? 
The answers to these questions will be evaluated with reference to the Islamist 
paradox summarized above, and the findings will be used to establish a coherent 
picture of the failure of political Islam in Iran. 
  
The next part will give a brief account of the historical background to the 
relevant developments. This will provide a context in which to consider the events 
analyzed in part five. 
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4. Background 
 
Shia Islam and Iran 
 
In order to understand changes and developments in Iran, and appreciate the 
radical transformations issued by the Islamist experiment, some historical 
background is needed. I will briefly account for key features of traditional Shia 
Islam, and central aspects of the Iranian revolution. 
 
Shia Islam – the religious tradition 
The principal factor separating Sunni Islam from Shia Islam is the question of the 
succession to the Prophet Muhammad. After Muhammad’s death the majority of 
the Islamic community held that Abu Bakr should be his successor, and the first 
rightly guided Caliph. The fraction later to be called Shia Islam argued that Ali, 
the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, should occupy the leading position. They 
thought that Ali should not just be a temporal head, or a Caliph, but also a spiritual 
head, or an Imam (Momen 1985:11). In 1501 the Safavide rulers made Shia Islam 
state religion in Iran. This was done to strengthen the position of the rulers, but it 
also laid the ground for the special standing of the religious leaders, the ulama, in 
the Shia community (Vogt 1993:181p). Whereas the ulama in the Sunni tradition 
have been involved in or controlled by the political elite throughout the history, 
the religious leaders in Shia Islam have retained a large degree of autonomy and 
independence from the ruling elites. This fact proved decisive in the development 
of Shia Islamism. 
The key feature of Shia Islam is the tradition of the Hidden Imam, and the 
most central doctrine is the doctrine of the Occultation. 
In its simplest form, the doctrine of the Occultation (Ghayba) declares that Muhammad 
ibn Hasan, the Twelfth Imam, did not die but has been concealed by God from the eyes 
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of men. His life has been miraculously prolonged until the day when he will manifest 
himself again by God’s permission (Momen 1985:165). 
 
The Occultation occurred in the 9th century. Because the Imam was both the 
spiritual and political head of the Shia community, his occultation left a 
considerable gap in Shia theory. The Imam was the one interpreting the law, and 
he was theoretically responsible for its execution. When Shia states arose in later 
centuries, a tension occurred between the theoretical consequence of the 
Occultation and political realities. In theory, there could be no justification for 
taking the Imam’s place since he – though hidden – still lives and is the leader of 
the community. However, the political reality was that the heads of the arising 
Shia states gradually filled some of the functions of the Hidden Imam. This 
divergence between theoretical considerations and political realities has caused 
tensions between religion and politics throughout the ages (Momen 1985:170). As 
early as the 11th century the doctrine was reinterpreted to delegate some of the 
Imam’s judicial authority to those who had studied fiqh (jurisprudence). Across 
the following centuries, the theoretical reinterpretation continued, and eventually 
left the ulama with authority to execute most of the functions of the Hidden Imam. 
However, political changes were needed before the ulama were able to bring most 
of these theoretical functions into practice (Momen 1985:189p). 
 
The traditional relationship between religion and politics  
During some nine centuries, the ulama were able to effect a very considerable 
theoretical consolidation of their authority, through a process of exegesis and 
innovative interpretation of the central dogmas. This process left the religious 
establishment with considerable autonomy and power separated from the state. In 
Sunni Islam the constitutional theory was developed in the presence of a Sunni 
state. Thus politics and religion were integrated; religion became a key supporter 
of the state, and obedience to the ruler became a religious obligation. In Shia Islam 
the development mostly took place with the Shia Muslims as a prosecuted 
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minority in a Sunni state. As a result, religion and politics largely developed in 
two separate spheres. Throughout history a minority of the ulama have cooperated 
with the state or actively engaged in politics to enforce implementation of sharia 
(Islamic law). But the majority of the ulama have traditionally held an attitude of 
‘political aloofness’, distancing themselves from all political matters and 
concentrating on furthering the sharia through their positions as religious leaders 
(Momen 1985:191pp). Still, there has been some tradition for opposition to the 
state on the part of the ulama in Iran. Some of them were even central in the 
constitutional revolution in 1905 (Algar 1972:236p). 
A number of different factors have contributed to strengthening the ulama 
in Shia Islam throughout history. One such event, occurring in the 19th century, 
was the development of the institution of the marja al-taqlid (source of imitation). 
Following from this was that every believer who was not a mujtahid (a prominent 
expert on Islamic law) should choose a trained mujtahid to follow in law and 
doctrine. Historically, the ulama had no hierarchical structure, but this 
development led to a system with clear hierarchical structure and ulama of 
different ranking (Keddie 1983:9, Momen 1985:204). There could be several 
religious leaders with the title marja-al-taqlid at the same time, if they all had 
large crowds of followers. The fact that every Muslim could choose which leader 
to follow, and that several different authorities could interpret religious dogmas 
and give rulings, almost gave the religion a pluralistic and democratic character 
(Siavoshi 2002:130p). The practice of taqlid (imitation) eventually had important 
political consequences. Prior to the revolution Algar wrote that the marja was 
“liable to dispense guidance on political matters in a sense opposed to the will of 
the state and ipso facto to become a leader of opposition” (Alagar 1972:235). This 
should prove to be right. 
The decades prior to the Islamic Revolution were marked by secularizing 
policies applied by the late Shah. With British and American support the Shah 
became increasingly dictatorial, and religious sources in the society were 
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systematically attacked and suppressed. This forced secularization and exclusion 
of religious leaders, were important elements in the renewed political activism 
developing in the 60’s among some of the ulama. In 1963 Ayathollah Rohollah 
Khomeini (1902-89) came into prominence as the most outspoken of the ulama in 
his criticism of the regime (Momen 1985:252pp).  
Generally it could be stated that Islamism all over the Muslim world was a 
response to the modernizing and secularizing developments encouraged by secular 
governments, and alienating religion. These trends unquestionably laid the ground 
for the dramatic developments in Iran. 
 
Velayat-e faqih 
Since the Safavid and Qajar periods, the ulama had claimed to be the Na’ib al-
Amm (general representative) of the Hidden Imam, but for a long time they 
refrained from the obvious next step of claiming political authority and temporal 
rule. The ideas were not new, however, when Khomeini developed and introduced 
the doctrine of velayat-e faqih (the rule of the jurist) in his famous book Hukumat-
i Islami (Islamic Government). The book was published in 1971 and was a 
collection of lectures he held to the religious students at Najaf after he was exiled 
in 1963 following his opposition to the Shah’s reforms. In line with Islamist 
ideology Khomeini argues that Islam has all the laws and principles necessary to 
guide a government and social administration, and that the Qur’an and the 
Traditions should be its constitution. The Islamic ruler needs an extensive 
knowledge of the sharia in order to be just and rule in accordance with it; these are 
conditions filled only be the faqih (the expert in Islamic jurisprudence). Therefore 
the most learned faqih should rule an Islamic society. This idea of governance by 
the jurisprudent is the basic theory behind the doctrine of velayat-e faqih. (Momen 
1985:195p). Traditionally, the most respected ulama in Shia Islam have been those 
refraining from political activity. Khomeini challenged this tradition by claiming 
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that it was a religious duty for the clerical establishment to actively engage in 
politics. 
The foundation for this apparently radical change in political doctrine was 
already laid in the 17th century. Two rival Shia law-schools had opposing views in 
the question of political power. The Akhbari-school claimed that all political 
power was illegitimate as long as the Imam was in Occultation. The Usuli-school 
also held that no political power was possible without the Imam, however argued 
that the illegitimacy of the state could be reduced by letting the fuqha (plural of 
faqih) operate as counselors to the rulers. They could thus act as representatives of 
the Imam by giving political advices that were in accordance with Islamic law. In 
other words, they wanted to open the door to ijtihad; individual interpretation of 
the Qur’an and the Traditions, for the mujtahids (the most prominent fuqha). The 
moderate view of the Usulis won the dispute, and further developments of these 
ideas culminated much later in Khomeini and his doctrine velayat-e faqih (Vogt 
1993:194). The direct claim to political power by ulama in Shia Islam is 
consequently a quite new invention, alien to the traditional separation of religious 
and political spheres. “Fearing for the very survival of Iran’s Islamic identity, 
Khomeini now concluded that the clerics should make the transition from moral 
guides to executive rulers” (Brumberg 2001:82). 
 
The Islamic Revolution 
Khomeini argued that the religious clerics had a duty to involve themselves in 
social and political affairs. He pushed the idea of the ’representatives of the Imam’ 
to its outmost conclusion, and claimed that the faqih was the only legitimate leader 
in an Islamic state. The doctrine of velayat-e faqih gives all power – political and 
religious to the just and knowledgeable ruler with the highest knowledge in 
Islamic law (Momen 1985:196).  
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Prior to the revolution, the Shia Islamic clerical establishment was subject 
to a hierarchical organization under ayatollahs with religious authority. The most 
respected ones; the marja al-taqlid, received religious taxes, zakat, from their 
followers – an institution originally directed at the Imam – and thereby achieved 
great economical independence. Whereas Islamism in Sunni Islam first and 
foremost was a lay movement in opposition to the ulama, the revolution in Iran 
started as an intellectual movement headed by religious leaders both financially 
and politically independent of the state (Kepel 2002:109). 
The successful revolution in 1979 was a result of a number of different 
factors and forces, and Khomeini’s most important achievement may have been 
that he managed to unite them in a powerful opposition to the Shah. One of the 
most central ideologues behind the revolution, Ali Shariati, propagated a 
religiously defined nationalism, appealing to young Marxists and secular 
nationalists, providing a broad social basis for the movement. Khomeini and his 
followers offered a solution to the social and economic problems in society. The 
disillusionment and despair experienced by many Iranians, along with their deep 
identification with Islam, made them receptive to the proposed solution. 
Khomeini’s charismatic personality and unique leadership qualifications, coupled 
with his religious credentials and courageous struggle against the oppressive Shah, 
secured him support well beyond his traditional followers (Menashri 2001:5). In 
order to mobilize the masses he used central Shia symbolism – like the death of 
Imam Husseyn, at the hands of the Sunni Umayyad Caliph – as an analogy of the 
Iranian people’s modern oppression by the Shah. The revolution succeeded 
because Khomeini managed to mobilize the different classes, unite religious and 
secular components, and form a coalition including all interested parties (Kepel 
2002:108pp). 
In 1979 the Islamic Republic was institutionalized with an extensive 
support in the Iranian population. The next task was thus to show that Islamism 
could fulfill its promises, by strengthening the standing of religion and provide a 
Master Thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies 
 
40 
The Islamist Paradox in Iran 
well-functioning state and society, securing freedom and civil rights for its 
inhabitants. An assembly of religious specialists wrote the new constitution. They 
decided to implement the institution of velayat-e faqih, introduced by Khomeini. 
The new institutional arrangements gave the religious authorities an overwhelming 
control over politics, and the Shia Islamic tradition of separation of religion and 
politics was thereby left behind. The new constitution embodied tensions between 
religion and politics, and compromises resulting from the difficult task of turning 
Islamist ideology into practical arrangements. Khomeini’s presence partly 
legitimated the revolutionary ideology, but after his death in 1989 the underlying 
tensions became very difficult to suppress (Siavoshi 2002:129pp). 
 
The fundamental changes in Shia doctrine, following the revolution, would 
prove decisive for the future legitimacy of the Islamic Republic and religious 
leaders in Iran. Moreover, religio-political dynamics unfolding the following years 
would make it evident that the Islamist system did not pass the test of power. 
 
 
Master Thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies 
 
41
The Islamist Paradox in Iran 
Master Thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies 
 
42 
The Islamist Paradox in Iran 
5. Analysis: The Islamist Experiment in Iran 
 
 
The Islamic Republic was declared with the support of a sweeping majority of the 
Iranian people. Both religious and secular forces were united in a common 
opposition to the Shah, and in the belief that Islam could be the solution to all 
problems in the society. However, in the first post-revolutionary years, the secular 
liberals and moderate reformers were mostly locked out and demoralized. 
Gradually power was consolidated by the conservative religious Islamists. After 
the death of Khomeini, theocratic and authoritarian forces controlled most power-
positions in Iran. 
Later developments in the country reveal that there is a new dominant 
understanding of what is the best relationship between religion and politics. Since 
the end of the 90’s a strong reform movement has evolved from within the 
country, headed by both religious and secular intellectuals. The movement 
opposes the regime and the nature of the Islamic Republic, and is increasingly 
gaining support in the Iranian population. It may seem as if political Islam reached 
its peak with the revolution and the support of the new Republic in 1979.  
In the following, the analytical framework laid out in part three will be 
applied to developments and features characteristic of the relationship between 
religion and politics in post-revolutionary Iran. The questions centered on the 
nature of the Iranian state, the relationship between religion and politics, and the 
functionality of the regime, will guide the presentation, and the findings will be 
summarized with reference to the Islamist paradox. 
Tensions between religion and politics were present from the beginning of 
the Republic. The difficulties were strengthened, however, as religio-political 
dynamics gradually unfolded, and revealed the weaknesses of the new 
arrangements. 
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Is Iran an Islamic State? 
 
Apart from the aim of gaining political power, the most explicitly stated aim of the 
Islamist movement was the establishment of an Islamic state. In Iran the 
revolution brought the Islamists to power, and the logical next step was thereby 
the institutionalization of an Islamic state to secure an Islamic society in which 
social justice could be fulfilled. The sole source of law, as well as the norm for 
individual behavior should be the sharia, and the Islamic society should spread to 
the entirety of the ummah; the community of the faithful. In other words; the task 
was to convert the Islamist ideology into practice. 
 
The Iranian constitution and the place of sharia 
Did the Islamists in power in Iran manage to institutionalize an Islamic state? If an 
Islamic state should be guided by Islamic principles and the sharia, the answer is 
‘no’. Sami Zubaida has carefully considered whether the Islamic Republic in Iran 
managed to establish an Islamic state as something different from the traditional 
nation-state. She notes that the Iranian constitution embodies a contradictory 
duality of sovereignties; written into it is “the sovereignty of the popular will (…), 
in line with democratic nation-state constitutions, and the principle of velayat-e 
faqih, giving sweeping, almost arbitrary powers to the ruling faqih” (Zubaida 
1988:4). The legal system is thereby a mixture of modern bureaucratic and 
traditional Islamic elements, with the institution of velayat-e faqih as the most 
central of the Islamic elements. The arrangement gives the ruling faqih, or 
Supreme Leader, absolute authority on direct legislation of general policy, and on 
interpretation of sacred texts and Shia traditions (Zubaida 1988:5). However, 
beyond this principle there is little constitutionally Islamic about the Iranian state. 
According to Zubaida: 
There are no systematic Islamic principles, such as constitutional or public law, to apply 
to the system of administration or to the organization of government departments. Islam 
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does not significantly alter the constitution or the administration of the state as such 
(Zubaida 1988:6).  
 
The question of taxation is an interesting example of how the state functions in 
this respect. The traditional religious tax in Shia Islam, the khoms, were paid by 
the believer to his chosen mujtahid, which would use it for administration and 
charity. With the Islamic state in power, the official ruling is that there is a duty to 
pay state taxes, and the khoms is largely left as a matter between the individual 
believers and their chosen mujtahid. Thereby, in spite of opposition from some 
conservative clerics who remain opposed to direct involvement of religious leaders 
in government, state requirements are not compromised or subordinated to 
religious practice (Zubaida 1988:6).  
This suggests that Iran is not an Islamic state guided by Islamic principles 
and that the ruling elite is only paying lip service to the religion it claims as the 
foundation of its legitimacy. According to Roy, the framework for a secular 
political space was provided by the constitution written in 1979. The constitution 
sets the place of the sharia – not vice versa. It could be seen as a modern 
configuration in which the state is both the source of law and the source of its own 
legitimacy. “The new Islamic state developed a positive law that became ‘Islamic’ 
by virtue of the sole fact that the state was Islamic: it thus marked the end of the 
sharia as the sole foundation for the judicial norm” (Roy 1994:177). Zubaida 
finally states that “[t]he Iranian case indicates that the Islamic elements of the 
Republic fit in very well with the nation-state model, both in terms of state 
organization and of the structure of the political arena and its discourses” (Zubaida 
1988:7). This view is compatible with Roy’s claim that: “The Iranian model is in 
fact a ‘secular’ model, in the sense that it is the state that defines the place of the 
clergy and not the clergy who define the place of politics” (Roy 1994:177). A 
despairing gap between ideals and reality are clearly evident in the Islamic 
Republic. “The paradox of the Iranian Islamic Revolution is that it has contributed 
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to giving roots to the nation-state, by giving it a religious legitimacy at the expense 
of the transnational solidarities” (Roy 1999:211).  
From this line of reasoning it becomes clear that the Islamic Republic is not 
an Islamic state. The Islamists in power did not manage to create the Islamic 
society they were aiming at, but rather laid the ground for the development of a 
system approaching the model of secular nation-states. According to Roy this 
failure was inevitable. The Islamic society was dependent on an individual virtue, 
tautologically defined to be the result of such a state. It can also be understood as 
the failure of the Islamist ideology to relate to religio-political and socio-political 
realities. A closer examination of the dynamic relationship between religion and 
politics in Iran is necessary to understand the developments in the country and the 
failure of the Islamist experiment. 
 
What is the Relationship between Religion and Politics? 
 
The Islamists aimed at building an Islamic society in which there should be no 
separation of religious and political spheres. The definition or creation of an 
autonomous political space was inconceivable in Islamist political thought at this 
time. Measured against the central aims of the Islamists prior to, and during, the 
revolution, the developments in post-revolutionary Iran indicate a failure to fulfill 
the Islamist agenda. According to Roy; “The failure of political Islam means that 
politics prevail over religion” (Roy 2004:40), a situation that has been evident in 
Iran for a long time. 
 
General legislation 
In the same way that the constitution decides the place of the sharia, the 
legislation is no more Islamic than the state. The Islamist logic implied that 
religion should lay the premises for political practice. The reality proved to be 
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different. Time and again religious concerns had to yield in the meeting with 
political, social and economic needs. Family law is one good example of this. 
Khomeini denounced that the existing Family Protection Laws were un-Islamic 
and decided to implement classic sharia provisions giving husbands and fathers 
wide powers over women and children. He also ruled that family planning and 
birth control were imperialist conspiracies against Islam and therefore forbidden to 
all Muslims. However, as a result of political pressure from influential Muslim 
women groups, one soon returned to the old laws giving greater rights and 
protection to women. And faced with one of the highest fertility rates in the world, 
Khomeini and the Republic made a complete turnabout on the question of family 
planning. Contraception programs were re-started, and followed by a public 
campaign with posters showing happy families with only two children (Zubaida 
2000:65). These kinds of episodes clearly showed the ideological impasse 
confronting the Islamic Republic. The regime’s obvious deployment of double 
standards probably contributed to a growing frustration and suspicion among the 
Iranian people – directed at the Islamist regime. 
The political precedence over religion became gradually evident, but was 
made very explicit with the constitutional reform in 1989, encouraged by 
Khomeini’s contradictory legacy. 
 
The Constitutional reform in 1989 
The Constitution from 1979 specifies that the ruling faqih, in addition to being a 
man of justice and superior judgment, should be the leading marja-al taqlid; 
religious ‘source of imitation’. After Khomeini, no Iranian cleric could fulfill both 
the religious and political qualifications necessary to be his successor. In such a 
situation the constitution held that a ‘Leadership Council’ consisting of three to 
five Grand Ayatollahs should be created to take the leading position. This also 
proved impossible, because not one high-ranking cleric accepted Khomeini’s 
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concept of velayat-e faqih. The only solution to the question of succession was 
therefore to amend the Constitution so that the charismatic basis of the faqih’s 
authority was diminished (Brumberg 2001:142p). The new Constitution, ratified 
by national referendum in July 1989, separated the position of marja from that of 
faqih. The demand that the Supreme Leader should be a marja is dropped, while it 
is stressed that the faqih possessing the better political qualifications should be 
given precedence. This favoring of political qualifications laid the ground for de-
clericalization of state institutions. The Supreme Leaders’s powers were enhanced 
by the new arrangements, but his position as religious guide was weakened 
through the removal of its charismatic-popular base. The Supreme Leader should 
hereby be selected by indirect election by the experts elected by the people. 
Further, the new Constitution affirms that the presidency is the next highest 
official position, after that of the Supreme Leader. This reinforced the president’s 
authority. Because the new arrangements broke the direct relation between the 
people and the faqih; the president became the sole elected representative of the 
entire nation. Consequently, this opened the possibility that the president could 
acquire a charismatic authority unavailable to the indirectly elected faqih 
(Brumberg 2001:147pp). 
The constitutional reform was a direct response to a pressing question of 
succession to Khomeini, and the ideological impasse facing the Islamist regime. It 
led to a peculiar arrangement of power, trying to respond to socio-political 
realities and at the same time preserve some key aspects of the revolutionary, 
Islamist ideology. The amendment of the Constitution clearly altered the 
relationship between religion and politics, and it went one step further away from 
the traditional hierarchical arrangement of Shia ulama. The highest religious 
authority – previously chosen by the people on the basis of religious qualifications 
– was now elected as part of a political play. “[T]he reform of the Constitution set 
Iran on a path from which there was no turning back” (Brumberg 2001:150). 
These particular challenges of leadership facing the Shia Islamists in Iran were 
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directly related to the institution of velayat-e faqih. Khomeini, as the popular, 
charismatic leader of the revolution, was the only one who could properly fill the 
position as Supreme Leader. But the problems were also related to the general 
Islamist agenda of creating a religious state, ruled by religious leaders. It is not 
possible to reconcile the tasks of political and religious leadership in a modern 
society. Fulfillment of one of the roles will compromise the functioning of the 
other. Eventually this will undermine both religious and political legitimacy. 
Khomeini himself played a direct role in the Constitutional reform, with its 
radical alteration in the balance of religion and politics, turning the selection of 
Supreme Leader into an overtly political choice. Repeatedly he gave priority to 
politics in responding to political and social challenges.  
 
Khomeini’s contradictory legacy 
As the ‘father of the revolution’, Khomeini obviously endorsed the Islamist 
ideology and the institutionalization of Islamic government. However, because he 
was the first to directly deal with the tension between religion and politics, he was 
also central in the process of establishing political precedence over religion. Thus 
he left a contradictory legacy, and his actions and statements are used by both 
conservatives and liberals to legitimate their positions in the current debate in Iran. 
Khomeini’s most clear and explicit announcements on the proper 
relationship between religion and politics were given shortly before he died. On 
January 1st 1988 he declared that the Government was a ‘divine injunction’, and 
that the faqih had the authority to define the interests of Islam and the country, and 
to take any action to defend those interests. This statement was a response to a 
speech by President Khamenei, implying that the Government’s actions was 
constrained by Islamic law (Brumberg 2001:135p) Later the same year Khamenei 
announced the primacy of the sharia over other laws. Khomeini responded by 
giving his famous edict on January 7th 1989, clearly affirming the preeminence of 
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the Islamic state’s laws over the sharia (Roy 1994:177) – unmistakably giving 
priority to politics. Again, such incidents could be seen as responses to socio-
political realities that were never acknowledged in the Islamist ideology, but 
becoming evidently real when the Islamists came to power. Khomeini tried to 
bridge the incompatibilities of the Islamist agenda, and his contradictory legacy 
illustrates the flaws of the Islamist project. Ironically, religious principles had to 
be suppressed to secure the survival of the ‘Islamic’ state. 
 
Khomeini’s death and his successor 
The revolutionary, Islamist logic was put to an end with the death of Khomeini in 
June 1989, because the highest religious authority and the highest state authority 
could no longer be vested in the same person. After Khomeini there were no 
candidates available with satisfactory religious and political skills. Put in 
Menashri’s words; 
[T]he most prominent theologians were not politically suited for the succession, and the 
religio-politicans lacked the proper religious credentials. In fact, the leading theologians 
of the rank of (…) (grand Ayatollah) did not fully identify with Khomeini’s revolutionary 
doctrine, and none of Khomeini’s loyal followers had the prominent religious standing 
(not to mention the charisma and political authority) of Khomeini himself to qualify for 
the succession (Menashri 2001:15). 
 
The election of Seyyid Ali Khamenei as the new Supreme Leader was first and 
foremost a political choice. The first intended heir to Khomeini was Ayatollah 
Montazeri. He had significant religious credentials, and had been central in the 
revolutionary movement. However, “Montazeri’s subsequent criticisms of the 
government and its revolutionary politics led to his disqualification in March 
1989, an event which provided another example of the supremacy of political 
considerations over doctrinal ones” (Menashri 2001:16p). The selection of the 
lower-ranking cleric Khamenei as Supreme Leader was a direct consequence of 
the constitutional amendment lowering the required level of religious scholarship 
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and giving greater weight to political experience and skills8. These steps were 
additional evidence of retreat from the original Islamist dogma, and the supremacy 
of political concerns (Menashri 2001:17).  
Khomeini’s doctrine of velayat-e faqih constituted a radical break with 
traditional Shia doctrine, and its implementation presented the regime with severe 
political and theological challenges (Menashri 2001:15). The doctrine did not 
make sense after Khomeini’s death, but it was too late to return to the old system. 
The revolutionary path followed in Iran, proved to have its limits. Internal 
struggles and economic problems contributed to undermine the newly acquired 
legitimacy of the revolutionary cause. Religion soon became an element in state 
strategies (Roy 1994:25), and its sacred position was undermined. These were 
logical consequences of the new doctrine. 
 
Khatami’s victory and the reform movement 
Despite the conservatives’ efforts to control elections, the reformist cause 
increasingly rallied support in elections at the end of the 90’s. The victory of 
Seyyid Mohammad Khatami in the 1997 presidential elections constituted a severe 
blow to the Islamist ideology9. His campaign evolved around a number of 
principles related to what Ansari has called ‘the myth of political emancipation’ in 
Iran. Central here was the implementation of ‘the rule of law’, to secure a fairer 
society, restrict the unpredictability of the state, and realize social justice. 
Interestingly, his central philosophy was that ‘freedom’ and ‘religion’ should work 
in harmony, and that religion would be defeated if conflict were pursued. 
Khatami’s central philosophies were reflected in the writings of Abdolkarim 
Soroush, an Iranian religious intellectual, well known for his criticism of the 
                                                 
8 Khamenei was president until he was appointed Supreme Leader in 1989. He still occupies the position as 
Supreme Leader in Iran, and is the head of the conservative establishment in the regime. 
9 When Khatami was elected president in 1997, he replaced Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani who had been 
president since 1989. Khatami still occupies the position as president, but will be replaced in the 
presidential elections in June this year. 
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Iranian regime (Ansari 2000:95p). Soroush has clearly voiced the need of 
separating religion from politics in order to save religion from being further 
contaminated. He argues that a government can not borrow its legitimacy and 
normative framework from religion any longer, but rather should derive its 
authority from the consent of the governed, and its norms from laws established by 
institutions representing the people. He further states that a possible motivation for 
the insistence upon the separation of religion and government could be:  
the belief in the fundamental truth of religion coupled with the fear of its deleterious 
effects on politics, or the belief in the fundamental truth of religion coupled with concern 
over its contamination and profanation by political concerns (Soroush 2000:57). 
 
Separation of religion and politics is increasingly proposed by both reformist and 
conservative religious forces – to save religion from contamination. Secularization 
will banish religion from the realm of politics, and thereby place the right of 
legislation and government exclusively in the hands of the people. This will 
further enable attention to civil rights and freedom independent of religion. 
Soroush argues that a democratic government is subordinate to, and realizes the 
society. Therefore, the government will take on a religious hue if the society is 
religious (Soroush 2000:61). By voicing these views on the relationship between 
religion and politics, Khatami openly embraced secularization, and indirectly 
opposed the concept of velayat-e faqih. 
Focus on the freedom and rights of the people were also important elements 
of Khatami’s campaign. Along with his views on the government and the proper 
role of religion in society, they proved to resonate well with the dominating views 
and feelings of the Iranian people. Khatami specifically appealed to the young, 
including students and women (Ansari 2000:97). Writing on gender, Mir-Hosseini 
states that;  
Women’s votes were among the decisive factors in the election. No political figure can 
afford to alienate the new generation of women who have come of age during the Islamic 
Republic and are demanding equal opportunities under the shari’a on all fronts (Mir-
Hosseini 2000:274). 
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Khatami challenged the existing situation, and generally responded to the needs 
and growing despair in society. The conservative candidate Nateq Nuri, supported 
by the Supreme Leader, and expected to win the presidential election, realized 
much too late that the old Islamist, revolutionary dogmas no longer had appeal. 
“So unexpected and so dramatic was Khatami’s victory on 23 May 1997 (…) that 
in retrospect it can be difficult to recapture the sense of national euphoria it 
engendered” (Ansari 2000:108). The election had an unprecedented 90 percent 
turnout, and “Khatami won an astonishing 70 percent of the vote, despite his lack 
of support of the supreme leader, the power establishment, and the state-owned 
radio and television” (Siavoshi 2002:136).  
The reformists were further strengthened by the dramatic electoral triumph 
in the 2000 parliamentary elections giving them control of the Majles. The 
reformists won 189 out of 290 seats, and the victory constituted another severe 
humiliating blow to the conservatives (Ansari 2000:207p). In 2001 Khatami was 
reelected president. However, the struggle between conservative and reformist 
forces continues. The conservatives still have considerable powers which they use 
to constrain reforms, and expel secular, liberal candidates from running in 
elections. And Khatami has not been able to fulfill his promises of freedom and 
civil rights. But there are good reason to believe that “[t]he failure of Khatami’s 
government is not the end of political reform in Iran” (Jahanbakhsh 2003:252). 
Although highly interesting in its own right, the prospect for reform in Iran is not 
of primary interest here. I will rather elaborate upon the significance of the above 
mentioned election results, and their relevance in understanding the trajectories of 
political Islam in Iran. 
In the 1997 election an overwhelming majority of the Islamic Republic 
voted in favor of a candidate openly opposing the existing Islamist system. This 
indicates that the people were tired of an Islamic regime that failed to fulfill its 
promises, and appeared powerless in the meeting with growing social and 
economic problems. The radical shift in public opinion – from support of Islamist 
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principles to secularization – also indicates that the Islamists in Iran with their new 
interpretation of religious dogmas ended up strengthening the social trends they 
desperately wanted to counter. Khatami realized that separating religion and 
politics were necessary in order to save religion from further contamination and to 
allow the government to represent the will of the people. 
According to Roy, the election of Khatami not only expressed the call for a 
more open and democratic society, but also showed the increasing crisis of 
religious legitimacy in Iran – leading to the supremacy of politics and eventually 
to a de facto secularization (Roy 1999:201p). In addition, it led to a crisis in 
political legitimacy because Khatami was elected against the avowed wishes of the 
Supreme Leader, which role was mainly political after the constitutional reform in 
1989. The Supreme Leader is thereby deprived of both religious and political 
legitimacy, and one could certainly wonder what is left of his function (Roy 
1999:212). 
The strong reform movement in Iran could be seen as another symptom of 
the failure proposed by Roy. A pervasive lack of capacity and means to secure the 
daily functioning of the state, coupled with obvious deployment of double 
standards, eventually turned the people against the regime. 
 
Does the Regime in Iran Function Satisfactorily? 
 
The Iranian people believed in change and a better life when the Islamists came to 
power. The current discontent among the Iranian population highlights the failure 
of the Islamist project to fulfill its promises, and handle the tensions between 
religion and politics – between theory and practice.  
In several areas it has become evident that the Iranian state does not 
function properly. Below I will briefly account for evidence of the 
dysfunctionality of the regime. Apart from the failed economy, the conservatives’ 
responses to agents of the reform movement, clearly show that the system does not 
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work. Further, the Islamist experiment did not bring justice and security for 
individuals. The limits of the regime result in desperate efforts to keep the state’s 
viability intact. Societal needs and human concerns are systematically suppressed 
to secure the survival of the state. 
 
Economy 
The regime’s failure to deal satisfactorily with the economic hardships in the 
Iranian society is one central flaw affecting large numbers of the population. The 
Islamists boldly claimed that in Islam there was the solution to all social and 
economic problems. But firmly placed in power, it soon became clear that the 
Islamists could not deal with the problems – the problems even increased. 
Disparity in wealth grew at an alarming rate, and unemployment continued to be 
high, especially among the young. Inflation on many key goods appeared to be 
completely unstable, dramatically affecting the cost of living for most Iranians. 
Politics and economics are intimately related, and reforms in the one are necessary 
to affect changes in the other. Khatami and his supporters realized this (Ansari 
2000:168p).  
Roy argues that the Islamic economy is an ideological construct that will 
prove unfeasible in practice, in the same way as the Islamic society. Depending on 
an impossible individual virtue, it will lead to abuse of power, speculation and 
corruption (Roy 1994:145). This proved to be right in Iran. 
 
The press 
The Khatami administration used daily newspapers as a central aspect of political 
strategy, aiming at informing, educating and extending political consciousness 
among the people. The press was radically upgraded both in terms of quality and 
quantity during the 1990’s (Ansari 2000:119). The reform movement was largely 
responsible for the expansion of the press, and thereby the public debate on 
Master Thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies 
 
55
The Islamist Paradox in Iran 
freedom and rights. The reformists gradually came to dominate the political 
discourse, and challenge the nature and structure of the Islamic Republic. The 
conservatives, increasingly frustrated by their lack of control and legitimacy, 
responded by provocations in terms of violence and ambiguous laws enabling 
them to restrict press freedom (Ansari 2000:157). After the consolidation of the 
reform movement’s victory in 1997, the conservative branch moved to close down 
some twenty-two newspapers and magazines. So sudden and suspicious was this 
move that it further compromised the position of the conservatives, and made 
evident that they had lost control (Ansari 2000:211p).  
The influence and dynamics of the press in Iran designates a strong civil 
society operating separately of the regime. The regime’s inability to deal 
constructively with such trends clearly shows its dysfuctionality. 
 
Student movements 
A growing awareness among students on fundamental rights and freedoms, has led 
to a rise in student movements struggling against the social system as a whole. 
Along with the press they constituted the ideological vanguard of the reformist 
movement in Iran at the end of the 90’s (Ansari 2000:117). The conservatives 
eventually aimed at the flagship newspaper of the reformist cause, and students at 
the University of Tehran decided to hold a demonstration to express opposition to 
the measures. When the conservatives responded by using violence, this sparked 
the most serious riots in the first twenty years of the Islamic Republic. Again the 
conservatives proved not to be on top of the situation. They responded by assaults 
and threats which once again resulted in a reduction of the conservative 
establishment’s popular authority. Contrary to their intentions, the conservatives 
thus repeatedly rallied the reformist cause and extended its popularity (Ansari 
2000:188pp). 
 
Master Thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies 
 
56 
The Islamist Paradox in Iran 
Lack of freedom and fundamental rights 
The election of Khatami as president in 1997 was a clear indication of the Iranian 
people’s discontent with the Islamist system, and the regime’s failure to fulfill its 
promises. Khatami focused on greater freedom for individuals, along with human 
rights and civil society. His sweeping victory clearly confirmed that the Iranian 
people were not satisfied with what the Islamists had achieved. The people want 
reform and a new system – not Islamism. The majority of the people supported the 
Islamic Republic in 1979. After two decades of Islamist rule the popular support is 
gone. The same powerful symbols in Shia Islam that once inspired the Iranian 
people to overthrow the Shah and support Khomeini, are currently making the 
Iranian people oppose the Islamic government and its Islamist rulers. Central here 
are the ideas of social justice and opposition to tyranny firmly placed in the Iranian 
identity, resulting from a long history of oppression by Sunni rulers, and more 
recently the Shah. It has gradually become evident that the Islamists brought the 
Iranian people another tyrannical regime, resorting to suppression and violence to 
maintain power. Further, the Iranian people are deeply religious, and they want to 
preserve religion and religious values in the society. Increasingly, people realize 
that the regime has misused religion to consolidate power, and that the values 
currently propagated by the rulers are not consistent with the Islam they adhere to. 
The failure of the Islamic Republic to provide social justice and secure civil 
rights represents serious flaws. The close association between God and state, and 
the unconditional drive to preserve the ‘Islamic state’, place the interests of the 
state before the interests of individuals. Religious minorities and women have 
especially been left unsecured (Khazemi 1996:133).  
Through the process of institutionalization of ideology, religion came to be 
associated with these shortcomings. “In Iran (…) there is now a move away from 
Islamic government. Islamic ideology and institutions, in becoming part of the 
state and politics, lost their sanctity and charisma” (Zubaida 2000:66). Thus, 
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secularization is increasingly proposed as a solution to save both religion and 
society. 
 
The Islamist Paradox  
 
The Islamists rejected a modernization that was already taking place, and at the 
same time they borrowed from that modernity. In the name of an Islamist ideology 
they denied the modern Muslim civilization, and sought to replace it by an 
artificial ideological construct. But their means eventually undermined their goals. 
“Modernity creeps into Muslim countries regardless of Islam, and the Islamists 
themselves play a part in this secularization of religion” (Roy 1994:22). 
The Islamists in Iran ended up destroying a solid Shia tradition of religious 
leadership, and they reduced the legitimacy of the religion and the religious 
institutions they wanted to protect. When the primary aim of political power was 
reached, the effort of trying to unite religious and political spheres set certain 
religio-political dynamics in motion, leading to secularization, de-clericalization of 
political institutions and delegitimation of religion. Along with the 
dysfunctionality of the ensuing regime, these developments amount to the Islamist 
paradox central to Roy’s thesis on ‘the failure of political Islam’. 
 
Secularization 
Roy argues that; “any political action amounts to the automatic creation of a 
secular space (…). Herein lies the limit of the politicization of religion, of any 
religion” (Roy 1994:23). As a secular political space is an element of modernity, 
Islamist political action, necessarily had to lead to modernization and 
secularization. 
We have seen that general legislation and the daily functioning of the state 
led to the establishment of such a secular political space. In 1979 the Constitution 
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set the place of sharia, and in the following years, political needs have repeatedly 
been given priority at the expense of religious concerns. This was evident in 
questions of taxation, Family Law, the amendment of the Constitution, and in the 
appointment of Khomeini’s successor. Put in Roy’s words, after the Islamist 
Revolution; 
Iran has been able to find a political space, beyond Islamist and revolutionary rhetoric, 
that does not depend on the impossible virtue of its members, but rather functions on the 
basis of institutions that survive in the absence of the divine word. A space, in short, that 
is secular (Roy 1994:177). 
 
The dynamics central to Roy’s thesis concern the associations between 
religion and politics, and they mainly occur at the state level. Separation of 
religion and state follows from the systematic suppression of Islamic principles to 
benefit politics. In a post-Islamist society, the conditions are thus set for profound 
secularization. In addition, secularization is increasingly encouraged by religious 
milieus in Iran: 
De facto secularization is brought about not only by the hegemony of politics but also by 
the endeavours of conservative religious milieus to ‘save’ religion from encroachments 
by political authority, even if such authority is Islamic (Roy 2004:91). 
 
A growing number of traditional clerics want to separate religion and politics – to 
save Islam. 
The secular, political space does structure the religious space in Iran, but it 
should be noted that what we are witnessing is not secularism – it is a form of 
secularization. Soroush has tried to express this in terms of ‘religious civil society’ 
(Roy 2004:91). The people in Iran are religious, and they do not endorse 
secularism as a new ideology, they rather support the separation of religion and 
state to save religion and secure a better society. This follows from the realization 
that both institutions will be strengthened if they are made autonomous. The crisis 
of political Islam does not necessarily lead to a weakening of faith among the 
masses, but rather to the privatization of belief (Roy 1999:215p).  
Islamism in power increased the distance between each individual believer 
and God. Roy argues that; “The ebbing of political Islam is bringing about a 
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detachment from religion. The fact that the revolution took place means that the 
flow can run only in the direction of secularization” (Roy 1994:181). 
Fundamentally, this is because: “Secularization is the unexpected but logical 
destiny of any mediator of a religious fundamentalism that happens to be taken 
seriously by a whole nation and society” (Roy 2004:41). It is the logical 
consequence of politization of religion, because “politicisation entails 
desacralisation” (Roy 2004:89). 
 
Delegitimation of religion 
“The overemphasis on state power by Islamists has resulted in the devaluation of 
religion. Empowerment leads to corruption, compromise and the loss of utopia” 
(Roy 2004:90). In the end, religious authority is lost.  
“The discrepancy between the political and the clerical order has logically 
been coupled with a slow de facto declericalisation of political institutions” (Roy 
2004:88). Political skills were given precedence, and middle-ranking clerics are 
currently running the state in the name of Islam, whereas the authority of the 
traditional religious leaders is undermined. The interference of religious, spiritual 
leaders in practical politics with all its imperfectness eventually reduced the 
legitimacy of those leaders, and the institutionalization of the religious state 
diluted the traditional hierarchical system of Shia ulama. 
Momen states that the Revolution headed by Khomeini was the last step in 
the development of the doctrine of Na’ib al-Amm (general representative) of the 
Hidden Imam, and that this change has altered Shia doctrine in an irreversible 
way. He also notes the institutional development accompanying this profound 
transformation. Shia Islam used to be a very individualized religion, with the lack 
of institutionalization as a central aspect. This was changed by the establishment 
of the Islamist Republic and the new Constitution, which put an end to the 
traditional religious hierarchy based on charisma and following (Momen 
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1985:298p). The previous situation without a politically appointed leader with 
absolute authority to interpret religious dogmas and setting rules of conduct, and 
the fact that each individual Muslim could choose which religious leader to 
emulate, gave a pluralistic and democratic character to the organization of 
religion. This arrangement was profoundly altered by the institutionalization of 
velayat-e faqih (Siavoshi 2002:130p). 
The traditional religious leaders lost their previous influence and authority, 
and the religion was deprived of its sacred position and transcendent role through 
its close association with profane concerns and political action. Roy highlights the 
irony of the Islamist experiment in Iran. He points to how Khomeini undermined 
the Shia clerical system developed over three centuries when he led the Islamists 
to power, and then placed politics over religion. “[He] eliminated the transcendent, 
autonomous space from which the clergy spoke: the clergy was brought down to 
the level of state, yet without really controlling it, since the political hierarchy is 
not the religious hierarchy” (Roy 1994:180).  
The unavoidable consequence of the inconsistencies in the Islamist agenda 
was accordingly a delegitimation of religious leaders, and a weakening of the role 
of religion in society. An increasing number of Iranians seem to be endorsing the 
view that “the clerics’ political involvement is ‘compromising their historic 
spiritual role’ and that it would be better for both Iran and Islam if the clergy 
returned to the mosques and left the task of government to professional 
politicians” (Menashri 2001:34).  
 
A dysfunctional state 
From the position of the Iranian people, the new regime has definitively failed to 
fulfill their promises and aims. Social and economic conditions have deteriorated, 
and the majority of the people do not enjoy fundamental freedom and rights. These 
flaws and failures are looked upon as a fundamental betrayal throughout the 
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population. The regime depends on violence and suppression to stay in power, 
because the Islamist project is not capable of generating institutions that can 
survive in a modern society, demanding fulfillment of juridical equality and other 
democratic principles. 
 The regime seeks to limit and restrict the full operation of civil society, and 
opponents of the Islamic Republic’s theocratic vision are systematically excluded 
from political participation (Khazemi 1996:150). Still, the Iranian society is 
undergoing rapid secularization and modernization compared to other Middle 
Eastern countries where the question of the proper relationship between religion 
and politics has not yet been put on the public agenda to the same extent. There is 
also evidence of a significant move towards democracy in the country. Future 
developments in Iran are difficult to predict, but they are likely to be related to the 
Islamist experience in the country. 
 
Failure of Political Islam in Iran 
 
As previously stated, the Islamic Republic was characterized by tensions between 
religion and politics from its very beginning. These tensions and the dynamics 
unfolding as a consequence of them, proved decisive in the fate of the Islamist 
project. 
I have argued that the Islamists coming to power in Iran in 1979 failed to 
build an Islamic state, that an autonomous secular political space appeared, and 
that politics repeatedly prevailed over religious concerns in the Islamic Republic. 
This was evident in the 1979 Constitution, the constitutional reform in 1989, 
general legislation, as well as in the appointment of Khamenei as successor to 
Khomeini. The unanticipated victory of Khatami in 1997, along with the 
continuous demand from the Iranian people of reform, reveals a growing 
frustration with the existing situation. The discontent among the Iranian 
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population results from a stagnated economy, and a fundamental lack of freedom 
and rights for the vast majority of the citizens. Extensive suppression and violence 
is not sufficient for the regime to control public opinion. The Iranian people were 
originally the prime supporters of the new Islamic Republic. Their present attitude 
signifies the extent of the Islamist failure. 
The analytical framework, centered on the Islamist paradox, provide useful 
references for understanding these developments. Roy’s theoretical arguments on 
the nature of ideological movements and religio-political dynamics thus seem to 
be strengthened by the findings. Inherent in the Islamist project are the seeds of its 
own destruction. Once the aim of political power was achieved, the Islamist’s 
actions systematically undermined their ambitions, because their aspirations 
towards political power were not compatible with their objectives.  
The Islamists in power in Iran not only failed to build an Islamic state and 
integrate religion and politics, they also instigated a crisis in Shia legitimacy and 
undermined the role of religion in society as they prepared the ground for 
secularization. The relationship between religion and politics in post-revolutionary 
Iran has been profoundly altered by the Islamist experiment in the country. The 
current situation reflects Roy’s description of ‘post-Islamism’. It results from 
politization of religion, and the political reaffirmations are repeatedly done in the 
name of religion itself. 
Roy attributes the failure to the inconsistencies in the Islamist ideology. 
One basic flaw is related to its dependence on individual virtue, tautologically 
defined as a result of the Islamic society it is intended to contribute to create. 
Further, the aspiration towards political power and unification of religion and 
politics, coupled with the central goals of countering secularization and 
strengthening the position of religion in society are loaded with incoherent and 
conflicting objectives.  
As an ideological movement, Islamism showed its potential as a 
progressive force gaining momentum in society in a certain socio-cultural context. 
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In Iran the Islamists were given the chance of turning ideology into practice, but 
confronted with socio-political realities, they did not pass the test of power. 
According to Roy’s theoretical argument, the Islamist experiment deprived 
religion and religious leaders of their legitimacy, and worked as a vehicle for 
secularization of society in post-revolutionary Iran. The Islamists have not just 
failed to fulfill their goals – they have even ended up escalating the processes and 
ideas they wanted to fight.  
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6. The Findings – Evaluated  
 
 
This study has been concerned with the central claims of Roy’s thesis on ‘the 
failure of political Islam’. With a theoretical and empirical approach, my purpose 
has been to analyze religio-political developments in post-revolutionary Iran, and 
by this means to explore the relevance of Roy’s thesis.  
In the following I will evaluate the findings, and comment on the theory 
and method used. The limits and centrality of the findings will be highlighted with 
reference to the unique and central nature of Iran in the Middle Eastern context. I 
will consider the fruitfulness of Roy’s thesis in explaining the developments in 
Iran, and based on these considerations, comment upon the general viability of 
Roy’s thesis. I will also return to the theoretical debate on the trajectories of 
Islamism, to underline the productivity of Roy’s approach and the relevance of 
conceptual frameworks in this field. Finally, I will comment upon the general 
importance of the case of Iran. 
 
Interpretation of the Findings 
 
Generally there is broad agreement on the view that the Islamic Revolution in Iran 
did not fulfill its promises, and even if successful at its inception, it did not 
succeed in the long run. The findings presented above seem to establish an 
unambiguous picture of a failed Islamist experiment in Iran. It is always difficult 
to isolate factors influencing such complex dynamics. Nevertheless, even if direct 
causes are difficult to establish, I find it reasonable to assume that current trends in 
the Iranian society are directly related to the Islamist experiment in the country. 
The Iranian expression of political Islam did alter the relationship between religion 
and politics. The associations considered above suggest that the Islamists worked 
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as a catalyst speeding up and intensifying the likelihood of their own failure, 
because they were obsessed with the impossible task of institutionalizing religious 
control over politics. Consequently, based on the factors and characteristics laid 
out by Roy, I find it rational to claim that political Islam failed in Iran.  
Were the failure and the developments caused by it, inevitable 
consequences of the Islamist experiment? Again, it is difficult to answer 
unconditionally. However, from a theoretical point of view, with focus on religio-
political dynamics, the answer is ‘yes’. The nature of such dynamics turns it into a 
logical necessity that religion and religious arrangements will be desacralized – 
and thereby delegitimated – in becoming part of every-day politics with its profane 
and fallible characteristics. It is also evident that in a power position it is 
impossible even for a religious movement to avoid the creation of a secular 
political space. And when confronted with social, political and economic realities, 
politics will have to be given precedence over religion if power shall be 
maintained. Thus, a de facto secularization of society, and delegitimation of 
religion will ensue. The legitimacy of the rulers will be undermined, and 
fundamental freedoms and rights for the inhabitants of the society are likely to be 
suppressed to secure the survival of the state. 
If a religious movement with a political agenda gains power and seeks to 
implement its ideology and vision, the likelihood and strength of the above 
mentioned dynamics significantly increases. Accordingly, the failure of political 
Islam in Iran followed from the Islamist paradox: Once the Islamists came to 
power they instigated certain processes necessarily undermining their own agenda 
and the legitimacy of their project. The theoretical framework provided by Roy’s 
thesis on the ‘failure of political Islam’ is consequently fruitful in explaining the 
developments, and my findings support Roy’s central theoretical claims. 
I have used historical material to document the failure and highlight the 
dynamics involved. Obviously, the findings presented are influenced by the 
method and theory used. Nuances in the historical developments have been 
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suppressed to draw attention to the relevant dynamics under question. Other 
historical events could have been chosen, and the developments could have been 
interpreted in different ways. However, there is relatively broad agreement on the 
nature of the developments under question. Disagreement is largely related to how 
to conceive of and express the relevant characteristics. As Roy’s thesis has been 
the crucial analytical tool and the focus of my evaluation, other relevant 
understandings and conceptions of the developments have not been given weight.  
 
The case of Iran 
Iran is a special case of Islamism in many respects. The historical relationship 
between religion and politics in Shia Islam is significantly different from that of 
Sunni Islam. Moreover, the historical-national context of Iran enabled the Shia 
Islamist movement, led by Khomeini, to gain an unprecedented support in the 
majority of the population. The successful revolution and its institutionalization is 
also unique to Iran, and the unambiguous situation of Islamists in power makes 
Iran very suitable for testing the theoretical claim that Islamism does not pass the 
test of power.  
Iran is such a good example of Islamism in practice that it is difficult to use 
properly; the present developments were largely unforeseeable twenty-five years 
ago, but now they are too explicit to properly compare Iran to other Middle 
Eastern countries. The fact that Islamism in power in Iran led to a deterioration 
and failure of the Islamist agenda can hardly be taken to prove that in other 
societies the same mechanisms were at work. However, Roy’s theoretical 
arguments are generally phrased, and my findings are consequently both 
concerned with the unique features of the Iranian example and general religio-
political dynamics. Thus, even if my findings are limited to the case of Iran, they 
suggest relevance for Roy’s thesis on a larger scale.  
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The productivity of Roy’s thesis 
The pervasive religio-political changes in Iran bring to light the country’s 
centrality for understanding the trajectories of Islamism. Roy himself draws 
heavily on the experiences from Iran in building his theoretical framework. He 
states that; “[w]hat happened in Iran is a good illustration of the conflicting 
relations between religion and politics in an Islamist system” (Roy 2004:84). He 
repeatedly stresses that Iran is a specific case, but following from the comparative 
nature of his study, he uses experiences from Iran to strengthen his claims for the 
entire movement (Roy 2004:88). Caution should be applied in generalizing from 
the case of Iran to countries where the essential premise of Islamism in power was 
never fulfilled. Roy, in building his general framework naturally makes limited 
differentiation between various fractions of the movement; differences in cultural, 
historical and regional contexts are suppressed for comparative purposes.  
Again judgments on generalizations versus particularities are central. 
Comparative studies with potential for generalizations are clearly of interest in this 
field; however, particularities must not be ignored altogether. It might be fruitful 
to be more receptive to differences in historical and cultural contexts. The special 
case of Shia Islamism in Iran is central in understanding the trajectories of 
Islamism because the religio-political dynamics involved in the movement’s 
failure are very explicit in the Islamic Republic. Still, the case is unique, and it 
should be distinguished on key features from developments in Sunni Islamist 
fractions of the movement. Roy’s project may take on even greater relevance if 
more attention to particularities is included. 
Another weakness of Roy’s thesis is related to limited conceptual 
clarification. Although he briefly defines the concepts relevant to his study, he 
does not put much effort into accounting for his conceptual framework relative to 
other conceptions of the phenomenon. And as previously stated, the new concepts 
he invents are problematic as analytical categories because they are not properly 
specified. Yet, for the most part his conceptual framework harmonizes with 
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established practice in the field, and I largely believe he applies it in a consistent 
and productive way. 
Roy addresses an important social phenomenon, with relevance far beyond 
the Middle East. Fundamentally, his thesis is fruitful because it generates new 
insight about the topic. The theories are developed from reliable and specific 
arguments, and they generate a comprehensive framework. The thesis is consistent 
with existing knowledge on the subject, and contributes in a satisfactory way to 
explain the relevant developments. I believe that my analysis has not been 
severely affected by Roy’s lack of sensitivity to individual cases and attention to 
concepts; I have been concerned with his key theoretical arguments, and I have 
been able to specify aspects and relations relevant for analyzing developments in 
Iran. Roy’s thesis did prove highly fruitful in explaining the relevant dynamics, 
and the shortcomings mentioned above refer more broadly to the productivity of 
Roy’s project from a general perspective. 
Roy’s position is strengthened by the changes in his thesis from 1994 to 
2004. From indicating that the Islamist movement had failed and that its remnants 
would largely disappear from the public scene, he still sticks to his notion of 
failure but modifies it by acknowledging that parts of the original movement may 
continue to influence societies in the Middle East. His contributions in the field of 
political Islam are of great value. He has repeatedly shown that he is willing and 
able to renew and elaborate upon his arguments and views when the realities 
change. He will probably do that again. 
 
The Trajectories of Political Islam 
 
The debate on Islamism is multifaceted, and so is the phenomenon. I have 
highlighted aspects of this debate, to argue that central critique directed at Roy’s 
thesis are more concerned with the nature of his project, than with his findings. 
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The debate has also been considered to show that different conceptions of the 
phenomenon are closely associated with differences in approach, focus and 
conceptual frameworks. Fundamentally, I have highlighted the relevance and 
productivity of Roy’s approach, but argued that different approaches may be 
fruitful for different purposes.  
 
Different conceptions of the phenomenon 
Roy and Burgat focus on different aspects of the Islamist impact on societies in the 
Middle East. My findings are consistent with Roy’s thesis; however this does not 
mean that Burgat is wrong. Even if political Islam has failed to build an Islamic 
state, and even encouraged secularization, political Islam is not yet irrelevant as a 
political factor. Islamism in its present form can, according to Burgat, contribute 
to modernize and democratize societies in the Middle East. Then what are the 
criteria for being a democratic actor? Can Islamism – if taken seriously – under 
any conditions be said to be an ideology promoting the common good? Such a 
view necessarily rests on a re-conceptualization of the phenomenon. 
It may be that Islamism, in its present form, can have positive and even 
democratic effects on politics in the Middle East in general and Iran in particular. 
The elections in Iran in 1997 and 2000 proved that the Islamists in power had lost 
support, but they also made evident that the Islamic Republic with its Islamist 
government allowed for a change of president through public elections. According 
to Burgat, “[t]he fundamental import of the Iranian elections was in the fact they 
allowed the first real instance of political change via the ballot box in Middle 
Eastern history” (Burgat 2003:171). I agree that these Iranian elections proved a 
democratic potential, even if Iran still has a long way to go. I also agree that the 
Islamists can be held indirectly responsible for these democratic tendencies. 
However, is it reasonable to assume that this was the Islamist’s intention? Or is it 
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more likely that the developments caused by Islamist action have occurred against 
the actors’ will?  
It could be imagined that Islamism might contribute to democratization 
today in two different ways. Firstly, the redefined groups and parties discussed by 
Burgat, may naturally give up on Islamist values and adhere to democratic 
aspirations. Secondly, the adversarial experiences from Islamism in power may 
push public opinion in a democratic direction. This might have been what 
happened in Iran. Neither of these alternatives, however positive they may seem, 
amounts to a label of Islamist success. ‘Democratic Islamists’ could hardly be 
called Islamists, and if Islamism has acted as a constructive force to convince 
people that democratization may be the best way to preserve religion as well as the 
rights of individuals, this could be seen as further evidence of a failed project.  
In line with Roy’s argument I believe that the reformist and democratic 
tendencies in Iran amount to a label of ‘Islamist failure’ rather than ‘success’. And 
even if it is possible to prove that future varieties of political Islam can contribute 
to democratic developments, this hardly undermines the argument that the original 
ideology of the Islamist movement has failed. Burgat’s observations consequently 
do not challenge or contradict Roy’s notion of ‘failure’. It may even seem as if 
Burgat’s criticism is based on a superficial rejection of the central tenets of Roy’s 
thesis. 
Still, I agree with Burgat that today’s proponents of political Islam, with 
their redefined ideology and aims, along with central roles in their respective 
societies, deserve closer attention in the future. But I believe that it might be 
beneficial to see them in light of the religio-political dynamics instigated by the 
original Islamist movement. I thus support Roy’s focus on the failed aspects of the 
movement, because this generates a relevant context in which to view the current 
expressions of political Islam. 
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The relevance of conceptual frameworks 
I have emphasized the importance of being conscious and explicit in choosing and 
applying concepts in this field. Differences in conclusions reached may very well 
be related to what concepts are chosen and how those concepts are applied. This 
may easily divert attention from central issues, and deter constructive knowledge 
from being shared. The divergence between Roy and Burgat could largely be 
attributed to such lack of conceptual clarification. Whereas Roy mainly reserves 
the ‘Islamist label’ to groups with an explicit aim of establishing an Islamic state 
through political action, Burgat argues that even if they play new roles, such 
elements are a continuation of the original movement. In the theory part I related 
this divergence more specifically to the relations between Islamism and 
modernization. There is general agreement on the fact that today’s Islamists relate 
to modernity in a different way. Thus, whether the notion of ‘failure’ is fruitful to 
describe the situation, and whether the actors involved deserve the Islamist label is 
a question of concepts rather than substance.  
Utvik holds that today’s Islamist movements increasingly underline the 
need for pluralism, democracy and human rights, but he acknowledges that 
whether this is called ‘post-Islamism’ or ‘Islamism as it has developed today’, is a 
matter of preferences rather than substance (Utvik 2003:15). To Roy, this radical 
transformation in attitude indicates the transition to post-Islamism, and underlines 
the failure of the movement.     
When adhering to the notion of ‘failure’, while acknowledging that political 
Islam is not yet irrelevant as a political factor, some distinction between 
‘Islamism’ and ‘political Islam’ might be useful for discussing current trends. Roy 
himself is not explicit on the nuances of these central concepts, and no general 
agreement exists on how to define and apply them. As analytical categories 
denoting complex political and social processes, they will probably have to be 
adjusted to be productive in different contexts.  
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Islamist movements have evolved in different circumstances and on 
different stages. Some fractions have undergone radicalizations while others have 
become more democratic. For the most moderate fractions the original Islamist 
ideology is largely suppressed, or only remains as a distant vision. They are all 
examples of political Islam. Islamism more precisely implies antagonism towards 
modernization coupled with the vision of establishing an Islamic state. To denote 
the views presented by theoreticians like Soroush, wanting to separate religion and 
state and create a democracy based on Islamic values, political Islam may be a 
more fruitful term. 
 To preserve the analytical value of these concepts it is necessary to avoid 
watering them down, but at the same time to allow for different definitions. As the 
concepts are likely to be repeatedly adjusted and applied for different purposes in 
the future, productivity will be increased if contributors to the debate are 
conscious and explicit on how the concepts are applied. 
 
The General Importance of the Case of Iran 
 
Iran constitutes an outstanding example of the inherent incompatibilities in the 
Islamist project, and the developments presently unfolding in the country are also 
exceptional in the Middle Eastern context.  
Several scholars in the field have noted the importance of the developments 
in Iran: “Current debates on democracy in Iran are critical not only to Iran but also 
to developments across the Muslim world” (Gheissari & Nasr 2004:94). Roy has 
also stated that; “more than ever, what is at stake in contemporary Iran is of prime 
importance for the relations between Islam and politics in general” (Roy 
1999:216). These are interesting and significant observations, underlining the 
importance of understanding and appreciating the developments in Iran.  
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The Iranian society has experienced radical political changes and diverse 
political arrangements during the past decades. It aimed at becoming a religious 
state twenty-five years ago, and is currently showing democratic tendencies. 
Observers, like Ansari, argue that the country will find a suitable arrangement that 
secures the will, freedom and rights of the Iranian people, and thereby show that 
democracy is compatible with Islam (Ansari 2000:219). This way Iran could 
inspire and influence other countries in the region struggling to find the right 
arrangements between religion and politics. Consequently, the developments 
presently unfolding in Iran deserve close attention in their own right, but also as 
central developments of general interest in the Middle East. Zubaida notes that: 
It is also a surprisingly more open and diverse political field than that of most other 
countries in the region. These differences, if anything, bring Iran closer than the Middle 
East countries to the Western model of a modern national political arena (Zubaida 
1988:6). 
 
The Iranian case is a unique case of general importance. The vigorous press 
in the country, the reform movement, and the public democracy debate are 
developments closely monitored and followed with great interest all over the 
Middle East, and far beyond. Experience from developments in the country ought 
to be taken into account in trying to understand the relationship between religion 
and politics in the region. However, the specific features of the case of Iran must 
not be ignored. In the debate on religion and politics in the Middle East, Iran is too 
special to be overused, and too central to be ignored. 
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7. Concluding remarks 
 
 
The Islamists enjoyed broad support when they reached power in Iran in 1979, but 
in the aftermath of the revolution they were not able to fulfill their promises and 
aims. A new dominant understanding of the proper relationship between religion 
and state is evolving among the Iranian people – they want reform to create a 
better society and protect religion. Clearly, the Islamists did not pass the test of 
power. 
I have tested the fruitfulness of Roy’s thesis on ‘the failure of political 
Islam’ in explaining religio-political developments in post-revolutionary Iran. 
Based on Roy’s theoretical arguments on the inherent inconsistencies in the 
Islamist project, I developed an analytical framework centered on the Islamist 
paradox, and subsequently applied it to the case of Iran. Based on the findings, I 
have considered the productivity of Roy’s thesis, and aspects of the theoretical 
debate on the trajectories of political Islam. 
The historical method and material used for analyzing religio-political 
developments have been fruitful for the purpose. I believe that the relatively 
unambiguous nature of the historical events and institutional arrangements 
considered has enabled me to generate a coherent and reliable picture of the failure 
of political Islam in Iran. Further, I find that Roy’s theoretical framework, despite 
its general and comparative nature, proved appropriate for analyzing the relevant 
developments. 
I have highlighted that Iran is not an Islamic state, that politics prevail over 
religion in the Islamic Republic, and that the effort to fulfill the Islamist agenda 
led to the establishment of a dysfunctional regime. The failure of political Islam in 
Iran was the inevitable result of Islamism in power, because the Islamists’ actions 
necessarily instigated the processes undermining the legitimacy of their project.   
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Based on the analytical findings, I have argued that Roy’s theoretical 
framework provides useful references for understanding the relevant dynamics and 
their consequences, and that the Islamist paradox is illustrated by the fate of the 
Islamic Republic. The Islamist experiment in Iran contributed to a secularization 
of society, and a delegitimation of religion. Moreover, the Islamist ideology, with 
its inherent inconsistencies, did not provide a blueprint for a functional Islamic 
state. Accordingly, the central tenets of Roy’s thesis are supported by the findings. 
 It has been stressed that these findings do not verify the general nature of 
Roy’s thesis, even if it is plausible that similar dynamics have been at work in 
other countries. I have considered the general theoretical debate on the trajectories 
of Islamism, and generally argued that Roy’s approach is fruitful for 
understanding the phenomenon. Further, I have suggested that whether or not the 
notion of ‘failure’ is suitable to describe the developments, basically is one of 
terminology, and underlined the relevance of conceptual frameworks in this field. 
Finally, I have argued that the experiences from the case of Iran are unique – and 
central – in the Middle Eastern context. 
Iran is still trying to find the right middle way between the Islamist 
ideology and political realities – between religion and state. The latest 
developments have shown a setback for the reform movement, and the 
conservatives are likely to win the presidential election in June. However, the 
opposition is strong, and the civil society flourishes. It is reasonable to assume that 
the setback is temporary; the Iranian people will not tolerate further repression and 
tyranny. According to Ansari, the processes have gone too far to be stopped 
altogether: “[A]n army may be resisted, but not an idea whose time has come” 
(Ansari 2003:66). And to some extent, the reformists have already won the 
political battle, because they have managed to transform the public debate in Iran. 
People talk freely about their rights, and even if Islam continues to be important to 
the vast majority of Iranians, its overt political role will continue to decline 
(Ansari 2000:215pp).  
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Future developments in the country are difficult to predict, but there are 
prospects for democratization in Iran. Significant in this respect, is the fact that the 
relevant developments are currently originating from within the country; the move 
towards democratization could not be attributed to Western influence. This is 
likely to strengthen the trends, because large parts of the Iranian population 
continue to be suspicious of the West, and especially the US. Ansari’s 
unambiguous recommendation is that: “Washington should resist the temptation to 
indulge in direct intervention” (Ansari 2003:65). Unconstructive responses to the 
country might undermine important developments presently unfolding. And as 
previously suggested; if Iran finds a way to preserve the rights of individuals along 
with its Islamic heritage, this could be relevant for the general prospect of future 
democratization in the Middle East.   
The Islamist movement failed to fulfill its political vision, but political 
Islam continues to be relevant as a political force in the Middle East. The debate 
on the trajectories of Islamism concerns an important social phenomenon of our 
times, and knowledge on the subject is significant for the future of international 
relations. Roy’s contributions to the debate are of great value. The insight 
provided by his thesis comprises an important background against which to view 
future developments in the region. The dynamic relationship between religion and 
politics, and the Islamist heritage are likely to shape political developments in Iran 
and the Middle East for years to come. 
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